

## ESTONIAN DELEGATION AMENDMENTS

### To INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE FOR THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP) AND THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP)

#### DRAFT CONCLUSIONS

1. New Point 1. Proposal regarding the wording: to bring part of Point 16 as a new point 1 (*current Point 1 becomes Point 2*).

„Condemns unequivocally the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, which has violated the UN Charter, international law and its own commitments, including the ones under the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine; condemns the illegal behaviour of the separatists and Russian forces in eastern Ukraine; supports the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation adopted by the European Council on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 8 September 2014, and believes that the duration of such measures must be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Package of Measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (the so-called Minsk II Agreement“), including the return to existing and internationally recognised borders within the sovereignty of Ukraine.“

*Comments: Main problem is that Russia, who is the main undermining factor of European security, is given little priority. Russia is first mentioned only in Point 7 (and then only in the context of the new security strategy); Ukraine, Crimea and sanctions are mentioned in Point 16. Although the behaviour of Russia gets a harsh judgement in Point 16 (among other things, the direct activities of Russian troops in East Ukraine are mentioned) and the sanctions are connected to the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements, the problem of Russia should not be hidden under the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy. It is an issue of strategic importance to Europe.*

2. Proposal for new wording (either for new Point 2, or to include under “The state of European defence”, Points 41–48):

„Emphasises that the threat posed by Russia to Europe’s security system is underpinned by its conventional military forces, demonstrated by the conduct of unannounced large-scale and snap exercises. In addition, Russia has combined military means with the coordinated use of diplomatic, economic, political, and propagandistic means, what has become known as hybrid warfare.“

*Comments: The long-term and unpredictable conventional threat coming from Russia (including the large and unexpected military training exercises, ability to mobilise and move forces quickly, readiness of the present regime to use nuclear threats) is not mentioned. And only besides all that, Russia commands the whole hybrid arsenal; the EU has potential to deal with it and it is important here to finally arrive to the EU-NATO cooperation. At the moment, hybrid threats get lost among other kinds of terrorism.*

3. Point 8 – NATO should be given more emphasis (e.g. “*in particular NATO*“).

4. Point 10 – Iran is mentioned, but the document does not say a word about the USA or China, or the wider Middle East (Syria and Libya are mentioned only under migration issues).

5. To be added to the draft conclusions: “Welcomes the conclusion of the European Council to mobilise EU instruments to help counter hybrid threats and looks forward to harnessing the potential of the EEAS, the EDA and the Commission to foster the resilience of Member States and partners, bearing in mind the necessity to deepen EU-NATO cooperation and take complimentary action.”

*Comments: Hybrid warfare is mentioned in Points 2, 3 and 7 in the same sentence with terrorism and climate change, but is not explained anywhere. The proposed text would suit under “The state of European defence”, Points 41–48, because additional emphasis should be laid to the activities that have already been started in the EU.*

6. Point 26 – Arctic may become a challenge, but maybe it is too early to say that „retreat of Arctic sea ice [...] represents a direct security challenge for the EU“.

7. We recommend to use the following words in Point 41 – “To keep the momentum the Council should revert to CSDP no later than December 2016.”

8. Point 44 – defence expenses are limited to “more resources in common defence“. It should be reminded that “*the European Council recalled the need for the Member States to allocate a sufficient level of expenditure for defence*“. The wording of the draft does not correspond to it.

9. In Point 45, the words “*improvement in the capacity of the Union and the Member States as regards territorial defence*“ should not be included; this issue is not on the agenda.

10. Points 41–48, “The state of European defence” – cyber defence is not mentioned, it should be included. The need that the EU and also the Member States have to be able to act in a situation of crisis should be mentioned.

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Tallinn, 1. September 2015

**Amendment presented on 2 September:**

We propose to insert the following sentence under any of the Points 41–48, “The state of European defence”: “Cyber defence needs more attention in the EU, including situational awareness, exercises and training”