

**INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE FOR THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP)  
AND THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP)**

**Luxembourg, 5 - 6 September 2015**

**DRAFT CONCLUSIONS**

**A more strategic Common Foreign and Security Policy**

1. Is concerned with the increasing threat of violent extremism and radicalisation, including of EU citizens, and calls on the European Union and its Member States to increase their efforts to combat terrorism, organised crime and radicalisation on the basis of the European Agenda on Security; recent terrorist attacks in the EU have highlighted the need for a strong joint EU response;
2. Stresses that the fight against terrorism and hybrid threats constitutes a top security priority; stresses that it is imperative to maximise the potential of existing tools while developing new measures, notably for the fight against terrorism financing and the recruitment of terrorists, online content promoting terrorism and extremism, illicit trafficking in firearms, while fully respecting human rights and the rule of law;
3. Stresses that cybercrime undermines personal security and privacy and welcomes the priority of the European agenda on security to improve law enforcement and any judicial response to cybercrime;
4. Considers advocacy of the exchange of information and operational cooperation in compliance with fundamental freedoms, international humanitarian law and international human rights law as an effective mean of fighting terrorism and hybrid threats; emphasises that better governance, the rule of law and democracy are important for eliminating the root causes of radicalisation;
5. Welcomes the mandate entrusted by the European Council to the High Representative/Vice-President with a view to the preparation of an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy by June 2016;
6. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative (VP/HR) to prepare an ambitious strategy, which will contribute to more efficient and coherent EU external action, in particular linking it to other EU policies with an external dimension such as justice and home affairs, trade, internal market, energy, climate change mitigation and adaptation, sustainable development and development cooperation goals; stresses the need to shift the focus towards effective conflict prevention;
7. Stresses that the new strategy shall provide strategic orientation for the current major security challenges, in particular the role of Russia, instability in the wider Middle East and cross-cutting strategic challenges such as hybrid threats, fragile and failed states, cyber warfare, climate change, resource conflicts and how to strengthen human security;
8. Insists on the importance of a concrete and efficient cooperation with the United Nations, NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the African Union;
9. Stresses the willingness of EU Parliaments to stay informed and to contribute to strategic reflection thinking and welcomes the commitment of the High Representative/Vice-President of involving Parliaments and the wider public; suggests to follow-up on this issue during the next interparliamentary conference;
10. Welcomes the progress achieved in the Iran nuclear talks and calls for a cautious implementation of the agreement of 14 July 2015;

## **Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)**

11. Recognises the contribution of the ENP in developing the EU's relations with countries of its neighbourhood; notes however that a revision of the policy is pertinent considering the developments and new challenges in the neighbourhood;
12. Welcomes the ENP review process launched by the Commission in cooperation with the VP/HR; stresses that the renewed policy must be more strategic, coherent and flexible; calls to maintain the unity of the ENP in order to approach the southern and eastern neighbourhoods on an equal footing; reiterates the commitment to common values, including democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms; calls to differentiate the ENP in order to intensify cooperation with countries of the neighbourhood with a stronger commitment towards the EU, without, however, neglecting neighbourhood countries which have chosen a less ambitious cooperation model in line with the more-for-more principle;
13. Considers that local ownership and inclusiveness have to be key elements of the new ENP in order to insure that it benefits all levels of society throughout the country;
14. Calls to link the ENP more closely to other instruments and actions of the CFSP and CSDP in the fields of: 1) migration and border management, under the European agenda on migration, 2) security, under the European agenda on security, 3) energy, under the European energy security strategy, and 4) environment;
15. Believes that a security component, including conflict prevention and peace-building, should be included in the ENP; stresses that the security component should encompass areas such as security sector reform and, in post-conflict situations, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; calls for the revised policy to support partner countries in building proper democratic state structures, inter alia to deal with security issues, which should be accompanied by proper parliamentary oversight; calls to actively promote the peaceful settlement of the various conflicts in the neighbourhood, using different EU instruments, on the basis of the added value they may provide –such measures should include confidence-building programmes, restoring dialogue, mediation, reconciliation, promoting people-to-people contacts, and CSDP missions;
16. Reaffirms unwavering support for the Ukrainian people and for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the European choice of Ukraine; unequivocally condemns the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, which has violated the UN Charter, international law and its own commitments, including the ones under the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine; condemns the illegal behaviour of the separatists and Russian forces in eastern Ukraine; supports the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation adopted by the European Council on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 8 September 2014, and believes that the duration of such measures must be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Package of Measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (the so-called Minsk II Agreement"), including the return to existing and internationally recognised borders within the sovereignty of Ukraine; welcomes the VP/HR's proposals on how to counteract Russia's ongoing campaign of disinformation and propaganda against the European Union;
17. Urges the EU and Member States to provide logistical support to Ukraine for the implementation of structural reforms and of its commitments under Minsk II; welcomes the Ukrainian government's efforts to date in this regard; further calls on the Ukrainian government to continue such reforms in the interests of good governance, democracy, and the rule of law;
18. Invites the National Parliaments which have not yet done so, to ratify the Association Agreements/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AA/DCFTA) signed with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, in order to facilitate their timely implementation;

19. Reiterates the European perspective of the Eastern Partnership countries and recalls that in accordance with Article 49 TEU any European country may apply to become a member of the EU provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights; calls on the VP/HR to develop proposals for cooperation with eligible and willing European Neighbours based on the model of the European Economic Area, which could constitute a further step in their European perspective, be based on enhanced inclusion in the EU area in terms of freedoms and full integration within the common market, and also include closer cooperation in the field of CFSP;

#### **The security implications of climate change**

20. Observes that climate change causes a multiplication of extreme weather events, a shortage of arable land and of drinking water sources in some regions, as well as rises in sea-levels ;
21. Deplores the human consequences of this development and fears that their escalation leads to an intensification of competition for local resources and to a higher volatility of basic commodity prices, which will result in an increase of climate migration and conflicts likely to destabilise the most vulnerable countries, and therefore considers that climate change represents a major risk to international security;
22. Calls on the Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the EU and the Commission to make every effort at the Paris Conference (COP21) to reach a legally binding agreement, addressing mitigation, adaptation, financing, technology transfer and capacity building of vulnerable states, in order to keep global warming below 2° Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels, and therefore to mitigate its impact on international security;
23. Calls on the Member States to honour their commitments and increase their contributions to the Green Climate Fund, which is a promising tool for the mitigation of the impact of climate change on the most vulnerable countries and for the adaptation to its consequences;
24. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to regularly present detailed analyses on the most vulnerable states to climate change and to suggest preventive actions, which could reinforce their mitigation and capacity of adaptation to climate change and reaction capacities to natural disasters;
25. Calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to mainstream the potential effects of climate change on security into the most important strategies, policy documents and financial instruments for external action and CSDP; stresses the need to explore ways of improving energy efficiency and environmental management;
26. Considers that the retreat of Arctic sea ice, which has led to an increased presence of a number of countries in the region, represents a direct security challenge for the EU and calls to reinforce the security component of the reflections on an EU Arctic policy;

#### **Towards more coordinated management of migration flows**

27. Notes with concern the increased irregular migration and human trafficking in the Mediterranean region and the significant number of migrants entering the EU from and through the Balkans; urges EU Member States to continue work in all areas by following the European agenda on migration presented by the European Commission;
28. Welcomes the launching of the naval operation in the Mediterranean EUNAVFOR Med decided on the 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2015 by the Council, which is aimed at disrupting smugglers' criminal networks; stresses that this operation can only be successful when implemented in full compliance with international law and as part of a comprehensive EU approach which also aims at addressing the root causes of migration and makes full use of EU instruments, including humanitarian aid, development assistance, diplomacy, conflict prevention and crisis management, as well as measures to alleviate the burden on those Member States that are on the frontlines of migration flows;

29. Calls for increased attention and engagement by the EU and its Member States with regard to the challenges of irregular migration passing through the Western Balkans as well as originating from this region; urges the Commission and the Council to develop proposals on how to deal with asylum seekers from EU applicant countries in the Western Balkans;
30. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to engage in a dialogue with the non-EU countries of the Western Balkans on how to reduce the flow of migrants from these countries and speed up the return of irregular migrants who do not qualify for asylum; emphasises that these issues should be prioritised in the EU's relations with the Western Balkan countries, including within the framework of the EU's enlargement policy;
31. Stresses that in light of these massive migratory flows, action cannot be limited only to rescue operations and dismantling of criminal networks of smugglers; demands that the EU and Member States develop a common approach based on solidarity and shared responsibility in order to foster better management and coordination of the massive migration flows; urges Member States to quickly implement the measures agreed on at the European Council in June 2015, including the decision to relocate and resettle 60.000 people **(to be updated in the light of future developments)**;
32. Underlines that the cessation of the conflict in Syria and the stabilisation of the wider MENA region are crucial for reducing migratory flows into the EU; condemns the violence especially of Islamist fighters, particularly against the civilian population; calls for an intensification of pressure for a real political transition in Syria and Libya; supports the need to extend development and humanitarian assistance to Syria, Libya and its neighbouring countries; calls on the EU to contribute to resuming the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, an absolute prerequisite to facilitate stability in the Middle East;
33. Recognizes that migration and development are interrelated issues; calls for the engagement of the EU and Member States to support countries of transit and origin of migration flows and to contribute more to the budget made available for the creation of regional development programs and protection in North Africa and the Horn of Africa;
34. Supports the initiative of the High Representative/Vice-President to initiate a high level dialogue with the main countries of origin of irregular migrants; recalls the need for effective policies on return, readmission and reintegration for people who do not fulfil the conditions required to benefit from international protection; draws the attention of the EU and its Member States to the need to strengthen the dialogue with the African Union in order to develop a common approach on how to address the causes of irregular migration and fight against migrant smuggling; [resolves to come back to this issue in the form of a workshop during the next IPC;](#)

#### **Strengthening civilian CSDP missions**

35. Recognizes that the EU is facing a growing number of crises around Europe; considers that civilian crisis management has become an important part of the EU's security policy; insists on the importance of civilian instruments in addressing the root causes of the threats currently facing Europe and its partners, including the Early Warning System, the Peace-Building Partnerships, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, and CSDP civilian missions;
36. Recalls the need to strengthen the EU structures of civilian crisis management, including by bringing in more civilian expertise at the strategic planning level; supports the ongoing review of the crisis management structures within the EEAS; calls for improving the efficiency of existing structures, including reducing the number of parallel structures so that they can respond faster and more appropriately to emerging crises; calls on the HR/VP to preserve and strengthen the distinct character of civilian approaches to conflict prevention and crisis management;

37. Notices that the most recent civilian missions have continued to be dogged by structural shortfalls, namely inefficiency as regards rapid reaction and too long and inflexible decision-making processes; stresses the need to intensify cooperation in defence and security between the EU and other actors, such as NATO, the United Nations and the United States of America, in order to increase synergies;
38. Recognizes that there is a problem with the recruitment of experts and qualified personnel from Member States for civilian missions; calls in this respect for a Civilian Capability Process, that can enhance the development, availability and initiate the required civilian capabilities, including by enlarging the pool of civilian response teams and urges the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States to set up joint pre-deployment training programmes;
39. Supports the EU's objectives to respond more quickly to security threats in order to prevent and manage crises more efficiently and this through strengthening civilian capabilities; calls in this regard on the EU to establish a border assistance mission in Tunisia (EUBAM Tunisia) at the Libyan border, to improve the security situation in Tunisia;
40. Demands that the synergies between the civilian and the military dimension of CSDP be strengthened; calls for civil-military cooperation to be enhanced in areas such as training, infrastructure, logistics, transportation and force protection;

#### **The state of European defence after the June 2015 European Council**

41. Takes note of the conclusions of the European Council of 25-26 June 2015; regrets that the conclusions failed to inject new political stimulus in matters of security and defence; considers that this lack of ambition is a worrying sign of a lack of political will in spite of the ever closer threats and challenges that face us;
42. Calls on the European Council to deal extensively with security and defence and to have an in-depth discussion on the shortcomings in the implementation of the commitments taken by the European Council in 2013; calls on the European Council to prove its willingness to implement past decisions in order to improve the EU's defence capabilities, to present proposals on reforming the financial arrangements for CSDP missions and operations, to maintain and consolidate the European Defence Agency and to provide support for a common industrial and technological base;
- [43.](#) Welcomes the ongoing work of the European Commission and the European Defence Agency in setting-up a pilot project and a preparatory action for a future EU defence research programme starting in 2021; regrets that the European Commission did not fulfil their tasks of the European Council of 2013, namely the establishment of a EU wide regime on security of supply, the announced paper on government-to-government sales, and the announced Green Paper on the control of assets;
- [43-44.](#) [Decides to conduct a workshop on the topic of arms exports during the next IPC in The Hague;](#)
- [44-45.](#) Urges the Member States and the Commission to deliver on the commitments made at the European Council of 19-20 December 2013 and to invest more resources in a common defence; calls for greater solidarity among Member States in funding CSDP missions and operations;
- [45-46.](#) Calls on the Council and the Commission to take decisions that will lead to an improvement in the capacity of the Union and the Member States as regards territorial defence, in complementarity with NATO, and as regards the capacity to respond to internal security challenges;
- [46-47.](#) Welcomes the joint communication by the VP/HR and the Commission on capacity building in support of peace and development, which aims to support EU partner countries

so that they have the means and opportunities to prevent and manage crises, including through concrete projects for capacity building having a flexible geographic scope; calls on the Commission, the EEAS and the Council to take forward the work on this initiative as a matter of priority;

47-48. Welcomes the Council conclusions of 18 May 2015 inviting the VP/HR to develop a framework for an EU-wide strategic framework for Security Sector Reform by mid-2016;

48-49. Calls on the Member States to fully implement the unused provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in the area of security and defence, in particular Article 42(6) TEU (permanent structured cooperation) and Article 44 TEU (entrusting of a CSDP mission or operation to a group of Member States); urges the VP/HR to actively promote these instruments and their implementation; [resolves to dedicate a workshop to the issue of permanent structured cooperation during the next IPC in The Hague.](#)