

Amendments tabled to the Conclusions

Version as of 4 September 2015

N°	Author	Draft conclusions	Written amendments
1.	EE	<p>16. Reaffirms unwavering support for the Ukrainian people and for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the European choice of Ukraine; unequivocally condemns the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, which has violated the UN Charter, international law and its own commitments, including the ones under the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine; condemns the illegal behaviour of the separatists and Russian forces in eastern Ukraine; supports the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation adopted by the European Council on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 8 September 2014, and believes that the duration of such measures must be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Package of Measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (the so-called Minsk II Agreement"), including the return to existing and internationally recognised borders within the sovereignty of Ukraine; welcomes the VP/HR's proposals on how to counteract Russia's ongoing campaign of disinformation and propaganda against the European Union;</p>	<p><i>Move parts of paragraph 16 to the beginning as new paragraph 0:</i> Condemns unequivocally the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, which has violated the UN Charter, international law and its own commitments, including the ones under the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine; condemns the illegal behaviour of the separatists and Russian forces in eastern Ukraine; supports the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation adopted by the European Council on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 8 September 2014, and believes that the duration of such measures must be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Package of Measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (the so-called Minsk II Agreement"), including the return to existing and internationally recognised borders within the sovereignty of Ukraine;</p>
2.	EE		<p><i>New paragraph 0a or 16a (if 16 not moved):</i> Emphasises that the threat posed by Russia to Europe's security system is underpinned by its conventional military forces, demonstrated by the conduct of unannounced large-scale and snap exercises. In addition, Russia has combined military means with the coordinated use of diplomatic, economic, political, and propagandistic means, what has become known as hybrid warfare;</p>

3.	IT	1. Is concerned with the increasing threat of violent extremism and radicalisation, including of EU citizens, and calls on the European Union and its Member States to increase their efforts to combat terrorism, organised crime and radicalisation on the basis of the European Agenda on Security; recent terrorist attacks in the EU have highlighted the need for a strong joint EU response;	1. Is concerned with the increasing threat of violent extremism and radicalisation, including of EU citizens, and calls on the European Union and its Member States to increase their efforts to combat terrorism, organised crime and radicalisation on the basis of the European Agenda on Security; repeated terrorist attacks in the EU, as well as in relevant neighbour countries as Tunisia , have highlighted the need for a strong joint EU response;
4.	IT		<i>New paragraph 1a: Strongly condemns the brutal execution by the ISIL/Daesh regime of professor Khaled al-As'ad, former general manager for antiquities and museums in Palmyra. Attacks of ISIL/Daesh against civilians and minority groups as well as the intentional targeting and systematic destruction of the multicultural heritage in Syria and Iraq as a result of an ideology of hatred and exclusion are reaching unprecedented levels, as recently confirmed by the destruction of Christian churches, monasteries and temples in Palmira or in Mar Elia, located in the Syrian town of al-Qaryatayn. All these attacks are war crimes in direct violation of humanitarian law, as stated by the UN Secretary General and the UN Security Council, and their perpetrators must be accountable for their actions;</i>
5.	GR	2. Stresses that the fight against terrorism and hybrid threats constitutes a top security priority; stresses that it is imperative to maximise the potential of existing tools while developing new measures, notably for the fight against terrorism financing and the recruitment of terrorists, online content promoting terrorism and extremism, illicit trafficking in firearms, while fully respecting human rights and the rule of law;	2. Stresses that the fight against terrorism and hybrid threats constitutes a top security priority; stresses that it is imperative to maximise the potential of existing tools while developing new measures, notably for the fight against terrorism financing and the recruitment of terrorists, online content promoting terrorism and extremism, illicit trafficking in firearms as well as archaeological and cultural objects , while fully respecting human rights and the rule of law;
6.	IT	2. Stresses that the fight against terrorism and hybrid threats constitutes a top security priority; stresses that it is imperative to maximise the potential of existing tools while developing new measures, notably for the fight against terrorism financing and the recruitment of terrorists, online content promoting terrorism and extremism, illicit trafficking in firearms,	2. Stresses that, following UN Security Council resolution n. 2178, adopted on 24 September 2014 according to Chapter VII of UN Charter , the fight against terrorism and hybrid threats constitutes a top security priority; stresses that it is imperative to maximise the potential of existing tools while developing new measures, notably for the fight against

		while fully respecting human rights and the rule of law;	terrorism financing and the recruitment of terrorists, online content promoting terrorism and extremism, illicit trafficking in firearms, while fully respecting human rights and the rule of law;
7.	IT		<i>New paragraph 2a:</i> Believes that the current situation requires the European Union to put at the centre of its action three global challenges: terrorism, which spreads from the Gulf of Guinea to Pakistan and has the epicentre in the North Africa, the Middle East and Yemen; Africa, as a continent that has won many battles in terms of the fight against hunger, pandemics and is economically growing very rapidly but is still lacking in terms of human development standards and influence at the multilateral level; the demographic issue, inherent in the imbalance between European and non-European countries and that is reflected in the migratory pressure reinforced by the thousands of refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey and pressing at the borders of all countries of northern as well as southern European Union member States;
8.	IT		<i>New paragraph 2b:</i> Recalls the resolution approved during the 196th Session of the Executive Board of UNESCO in Paris last April, "Cultures in conflict areas: a humanitarian concern and a safety issue. UNESCO's role and responsibilities" (196 EX/29; 196 EX/DG.INF Rev.; 196 EX/40 Rev.) as well as the European Parliament resolution 2015/2649 (RSP) on the destruction of cultural sites perpetrated by ISIL/Daesh;
9.	IT		<i>New paragraph 2c:</i> Underlines that the new EU Strategy on foreign and security policy shall promote every effort to preserve sites of cultural and archaeological interest from military attacks and to submit crimes of destruction of cultural heritage to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court;
10.	IT		<i>New paragraph 2d:</i> Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative (VP/HR) and the Member States to focus on the implementation of the EU Cybersecurity Strategy adopted by the Council in February 2013 with particular regard to the development of security standards and certification schemes, and the fostering of R&D programs

			aimed at the acquisition of such information and communication technologies (ICT) that the EU needs to avoid the risk to become excessively dependent on ICT products and services produced outside its frontiers;
11.	PL		<i>New paragraph 2e:</i> Stresses that hybrid threats to the EU, its Member States and its partners may emanate in a diverse way from state and non-state actors in different geographical areas adjacent to the EU. The hybrid warfare model introduced by Russia – which has been executed and perfected since March 2014 in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine – requires an adequate, joint and timely reaction of all EU Member States and relevant International Organizations. Countering hybrid warfare requires further enhancing of a political and strategic cooperation between NATO and the EU. Both organizations should work in a mutually complementary and supportive manner maintaining at the same time the autonomy of their actions;
12.	PL		<i>New paragraph 2f:</i> Points out that the fight against terrorism implies long-term measures with a view to preventing the causes of terrorism, by promoting, in particular, cohesion in our societies and a multicultural and inter-religious dialogue. In order to combat radicalisation, issues of social exclusion, migrant integration and discrimination must be taken into account;
13.	IT	4. Considers advocacy of the exchange of information and operational cooperation in compliance with fundamental freedoms, international humanitarian law and international human rights law as an effective mean of fighting terrorism and hybrid threats; emphasises that better governance, the rule of law and democracy are important for eliminating the root causes of radicalisation;	4. Considers advocacy of the exchange of information and operational cooperation in compliance with fundamental freedoms, international humanitarian law and international human rights law as an effective mean of fighting terrorism and hybrid threats; emphasises that better governance, the rule of law and democracy, as well as social and economic development , are crucial for eliminating the root causes of radicalisation;

14.	IT		<i>New paragraph 4a: Welcomes the new Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy for the period 2015-2019, adopted by the Council on 20 July 2015, because it reaffirms the European Union's commitment to promote and protect human rights and to support democracy worldwide;</i>
15.	IT	6. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative (VP/HR) to prepare an ambitious strategy, which will contribute to more efficient and coherent EU external action, in particular linking it to other EU policies with an external dimension such as justice and home affairs, trade, internal market, energy, climate change mitigation and adaptation, sustainable development and development cooperation goals; stresses the need to shift the focus towards effective conflict prevention;	6. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative (VP/HR) to prepare an ambitious strategy, which will contribute to more efficient and coherent EU external action, in particular linking it to other EU policies with an external dimension such as migration , justice and home affairs, trade, internal market, energy, climate change mitigation and adaptation, sustainable development and development cooperation goals; stresses the need to shift the focus towards effective conflict prevention;
16.	DE	6. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative (VP/HR) to prepare an ambitious strategy, which will contribute to more efficient and coherent EU external action, in particular linking it to other EU policies with an external dimension such as justice and home affairs, trade, internal market, energy, climate change mitigation and adaptation, sustainable development and development cooperation goals; stresses the need to shift the focus towards effective conflict prevention;	6. Calls on the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative (VP/HR) to prepare an ambitious EU global strategy on foreign and security policy , which will contribute to more efficient and coherent EU external action in particular linking it to other EU policies with an external dimension such as justice and home affairs, trade, internal market, energy, climate change mitigation and adaptation, sustainable development and development cooperation goals; stresses the need to shift the focus towards effective conflict prevention; calls for the strengthening of resilience in the European states to be incorporated into the security strategy;
17.	IT	7. Stresses that the new strategy shall provide strategic orientation for the current major security challenges, in particular the role of Russia , instability in the wider Middle East and cross-cutting strategic challenges such as hybrid threats, fragile and failed states, cyber warfare, climate change, resource conflicts and how to strengthen human security;	7. Stresses that the new strategy shall provide strategic orientation for the current major security challenges, instability in the wider Middle East, in the Mediterranean and cross-cutting strategic challenges such as hybrid threats, fragile and failed states, cyber warfare, climate change, trafficking of human beings , resource conflicts and how to strengthen human security;

18.	DE	7. Stresses that the new strategy shall provide strategic orientation for the current major security challenges, in particular the role of Russia, instability in the wider Middle East and cross-cutting strategic challenges such as hybrid threats, fragile and failed states, cyber warfare , climate change, resource conflicts and how to strengthen human security;	7. Stresses that the new strategy shall provide strategic orientation for the current major security challenges, in particular the role of Russia, instability in the wider Middle East and cross-cutting strategic challenges such as hybrid threats, fragile and failed states, threats to cyber attacks , climate change, resource conflicts and how to strengthen human security;
19.	IE	7. Stresses that the new strategy shall provide strategic orientation for the current major security challenges, in particular the role of Russia, instability in the wider Middle East and cross-cutting strategic challenges such as hybrid threats, fragile and failed states, cyber warfare, climate change, resource conflicts and how to strengthen human security;	7. Stresses that the new strategy should provide strategic orientation for the current major security challenges, in particular the role of Russia, instability in the wider Middle East and cross-cutting strategic challenges such as hybrid threats, fragile and failed states, cyber warfare, climate change, resource conflicts and how to strengthen human security;
20.	SE	8. Insists on the importance of a concrete and efficient cooperation with the United Nations, NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the African Union;	8. Underlines/emphasizes on the importance of a concrete and efficient cooperation with the United Nations, NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the African Union;
21.	EE	8. Insists on the importance of a concrete and efficient cooperation with the United Nations, NATO , the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the African Union;	8. Insists on the importance of a concrete and efficient cooperation with NATO in particular and with the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the African Union;
22.	IT	8. Insists on the importance of a concrete and efficient cooperation with the United Nations, NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the African Union;	8. Insists on the importance of a concrete and efficient cooperation with the United Nations, NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the African Union and of an enhanced dialogue with major international actors such as Russia, China and the United States;
23.	IE	9. Stresses the willingness of EU Parliaments to stay informed and to contribute to strategic reflection thinking and welcomes the commitment of the High Representative/Vice-President of involving Parliaments and the wider public; suggests to follow-up on this issue during the next interparliamentary conference;	9. Stresses the willingness of EU Parliaments to stay informed and to contribute to strategic reflection and welcomes the commitment of the High Representative/Vice-President of involving Parliaments and the wider public; suggests to follow-up on this issue during the next interparliamentary conference;
24.	SE	10. Welcomes the progress achieved in the Iran nuclear talks and calls for a cautious implementation of the agreement of 14 July 2015;	10. Welcomes the progress achieved in the Iran nuclear talks and calls on all parties to implement the agreement of 14 July 2015;
25.	IT	10. Welcomes the progress achieved in the Iran nuclear talks and calls for	10. Welcomes the progress achieved in the Iran nuclear talks and calls for

		a cautious implementation of the agreement of 14 July 2015;	a full implementation by all parties of the agreement of 14 July 2015;
26.	IT	11. Recognises the contribution of the ENP in developing the EU's relations with countries of its neighbourhood; notes however that a revision of the policy is pertinent considering the developments and new challenges in the neighbourhood;	11. Recognises the contribution of the ENP in developing the EU's relations with countries of its neighbourhood; notes however that a revision of the policy is pertinent considering the developments and new challenges in the neighbourhood, including the relations with the "neighbours of our neighbours" ;
27.	IE	11. Recognises the contribution of the ENP in developing the EU's relations with countries of its neighbourhood; notes however that a revision of the policy is pertinent considering the developments and new challenges in the neighbourhood;	11. Recognises the contribution of the ENP in developing the EU's relations with countries of its neighbourhood; notes however that a review of the policy is pertinent considering the developments and new challenges in the neighbourhood;
28.	SE	12. Welcomes the ENP review process launched by the Commission in cooperation with the VP/HR; stresses that the renewed policy must be more strategic, coherent and flexible; calls to maintain the unity of the ENP in order to approach the southern and eastern neighbourhoods on an equal footing ; reiterates the commitment to common values, including democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms; calls to differentiate the ENP in order to intensify cooperation with countries of the neighbourhood with a stronger commitment towards the EU, without, however, neglecting neighbourhood countries which have chosen a less ambitious cooperation model in line with the more-for-more principle;	12. Welcomes the ENP review process launched by the Commission in cooperation with the VP/HR; stresses that the renewed policy must be more strategic, coherent and flexible; calls to maintain the unity of the ENP; stresses the importance of the southern and eastern partnerships as a central part of the ENP ; reiterates the commitment to common values, including democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms, and gender equality ; calls to differentiate the ENP in order to intensify cooperation with countries of the neighbourhood with a stronger commitment towards the EU, without, however, neglecting neighbourhood countries which have chosen a less ambitious cooperation model in line with the more-for-more principle;
29.	IT	12. Welcomes the ENP review process launched by the Commission in cooperation with the VP/HR; stresses that the renewed policy must be more strategic, coherent and flexible; calls to maintain the unity of the ENP in order to approach the southern and eastern neighbourhoods on an equal footing; reiterates the commitment to common values, including democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms; calls to differentiate the ENP in order to intensify cooperation with countries of the neighbourhood with a stronger commitment towards the EU, without, however, neglecting	12. Welcomes the ENP review process launched by the Commission in cooperation with the VP/HR; stresses that the renewed policy must be more strategic, coherent and flexible in its procedures, nonetheless safeguarding its predictability since the ENP is a medium-to-long term policy framework ; calls to maintain the unity of the ENP in order to approach the southern and eastern neighbourhoods on an equal footing (provided that the established internal allocation of ENP resources - two-thirds to the southern partnership and one-third to the eastern partnership - is confirmed) ; reiterates the commitment to common

		neighbourhood countries which have chosen a less ambitious cooperation model in line with the more-for-more principle;	values, including democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms; calls to differentiate the ENP in order to intensify cooperation with countries of the neighbourhood with a stronger commitment towards the EU, in line with the more-for-more principle related to institutional and economic reforms without, however, neglecting neighbourhood countries which have chosen to follow a less ambitious cooperation model;
30.	IE	12. Welcomes the ENP review process launched by the Commission in cooperation with the VP/HR; stresses that the renewed policy must be more strategic, coherent and flexible; calls to maintain the unity of the ENP in order to approach the southern and eastern neighbourhoods on an equal footing; reiterates the commitment to common values, including democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms; calls to differentiate the ENP in order to intensify cooperation with countries of the neighbourhood with a stronger commitment towards the EU, without, however, neglecting neighbourhood countries which have chosen a less ambitious cooperation model in line with the more-for-more principle;	12. Welcomes the ENP review process launched by the Commission in cooperation with the VP/HR; stresses that the renewed policy must be more strategic, coherent and flexible; calls to maintain the unity of the ENP in order to approach the southern and eastern neighbourhoods on an equal footing; reiterates the commitment to common values, including democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms; calls to differentiate the ENP in line with the more-for-more principle;
31.	IT		<i>New paragraph 12a: To preserve the unitary framework of the ENP, a more nuanced approach is needed to differentiate between the southern and the eastern dimensions. A tailored approach has to be introduced for each country, the ‘more for more’ model used hitherto must be mitigated, and greater account must be taken of the widely differing starting points and initial conditions when evaluating the results. The effective demands of partner countries should be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis;</i>
32.	IT	13. Considers that local ownership and inclusiveness have to be key elements of the new ENP in order to insure that it benefits all levels of society throughout the country;	13. Considers that local ownership, differentiation and inclusiveness have to be key elements of the new ENP in order to insure that it benefits all levels of society throughout the country;
33.	IT	14. Calls to link the ENP more closely to other instruments and actions of	14. As part of the process of tightening coordination between policies

		the CFSP and CSDP in the fields of: 1) migration and border management, under the European agenda on migration, 2) security, under the European agenda on security, 3) energy, under the European energy security strategy, and 4) environment;	with a strong external dimension , calls to link the ENP more closely to other instruments and actions relevant for CFSP and CSDP, enhancing the role of the High Representative and the EEAS, pursuant to the provisions of article 18 (4) TEU , in the fields of: 1) migration and border management, under the European agenda on migration, 2) security, under the European agenda on security, 3) energy, under the European energy security strategy, and 4) environment;
34.	GR	15. Believes that a security component, including conflict prevention and peace-building, should be included in the ENP; stresses that the security component should encompass areas such as security sector reform and, in post-conflict situations, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; calls for the revised policy to support partner countries in building proper democratic state structures, inter alia to deal with security issues, which should be accompanied by proper parliamentary oversight; calls to actively promote the peaceful settlement of the various conflicts in the neighbourhood, using different EU instruments, on the basis of the added value they may provide – such measures should include confidence-building programmes, restoring dialogue, mediation, reconciliation, promoting people-to-people contacts, and CSDP missions;	15. Believes that coherence of the ENP with the security and foreign policy dimensions of the EU's actions abroad should be ensured ; stresses that the ENP should contribute to promoting stability in the neighbourhood in line with the relevant EU policies such as the area of Freedom, Security and Justice ; calls for the revised policy to support partner countries in addressing security threats, notably through security sector reforms , which should be accompanied by proper parliamentary oversight; calls to actively promote a flexible response to the changing situation in the region, challenges and crises, aiming at closer coordination between ENP and wider CFSP/CSDP activities in a comprehensive manner ;
35.	IT	15. Believes that a security component, including conflict prevention and peace-building, should be included in the ENP; stresses that the security component should encompass areas such as security sector reform and, in post-conflict situations, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; calls for the revised policy to support partner countries in building proper democratic state structures, inter alia to deal with security issues, which should be accompanied by proper parliamentary oversight; calls to actively promote the peaceful settlement of the various conflicts in the neighbourhood, using different EU instruments, on the basis of the added value they may provide –such measures should include confidence-building programmes, restoring dialogue, mediation, reconciliation,	15. Believes that, in order to include a security component in the ENP, there should be greater consistency and complementarity between ENP and CFSP/CSDP activities ; stresses that the security component should encompass areas such as security sector reform and, in post-conflict situations, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; calls for the revised policy to support partner countries in building proper democratic state structures, <i>inter alia</i> to deal with security issues, which should be accompanied by proper parliamentary oversight; calls to actively promote the peaceful settlement of the various conflicts in the neighbourhood, using different EU instruments, on the basis of the added value they may provide –such measures should include confidence-building programmes, restoring dialogue, mediation,

		promoting people-to-people contacts, and CSDP missions;	reconciliation, promoting people-to-people contacts, and CSDP missions;
36.	IT		<i>New title before paragraph 16: The situation in Ukraine</i>
37.	GR	<p>16. Reaffirms unwavering support for the Ukrainian people and for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the European choice of Ukraine; unequivocally condemns the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, which has violated the UN Charter, international law and its own commitments, including the ones under the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine; condemns the illegal behaviour of the separatists and Russian forces in eastern Ukraine; supports the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation adopted by the European Council on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 8 September 2014, and believes that the duration of such measures must be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Package of Measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (the so-called Minsk II Agreement"), including the return to existing and internationally recognised borders within the sovereignty of Ukraine; welcomes the VP/HR's proposals on how to counteract Russia's ongoing campaign of disinformation and propaganda against the European Union;</p>	<p>16. Reaffirms unwavering support for the Ukrainian people and for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine; unequivocally condemns the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by the Russian Federation and will remain committed to fully implement its non-recognition; condemns the illegal behaviour of the separatists in eastern Ukraine; supports the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation adopted by the European Council on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 8 September 2014, and believes that the duration of such measures must be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Minsk Agreements; welcomes the VP/HR's Action Plan on how to challenge Russia's ongoing campaign of disinformation;</p>
38.	IT	<p>16. Reaffirms unwavering support for the Ukrainian people and for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the European choice of Ukraine; unequivocally condemns the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, which has violated the UN Charter, international law and its own commitments, including the ones under the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine; condemns the illegal behaviour of the separatists and Russian forces in eastern Ukraine; supports the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation adopted by the European Council on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 8 September 2014, and believes that the duration of such measures must be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Package of Measures for</p>	<p>16. Reaffirms unwavering support for the Ukrainian people and for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the European choice of Ukraine; condemns the occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, which has violated the UN Charter, international law and its own commitments, including the ones under the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine; supports the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation adopted by the European Council on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 8 September 2014, and believes that the duration of such measures must be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Package of Measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (the so-called Minsk II Agreement"), including the return to existing and</p>

		the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (the so-called Minsk II Agreement"), including the return to existing and internationally recognised borders within the sovereignty of Ukraine; welcomes the VP/HR's proposals on how to counteract Russia's ongoing campaign of disinformation and propaganda against the European Union;	internationally recognised borders within the sovereignty of Ukraine; explores the possibility for compensation measures for European small and medium enterprises and chains of production more affected by the consequences of the sanctions against Russia ; welcomes the VP/HR's proposals on how to counteract Russia's ongoing campaign of disinformation and propaganda against the European Union.
39.	DE	16. Reaffirms unwavering support for the Ukrainian people and for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the European choice of Ukraine; unequivocally condemns the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, which has violated the UN Charter, international law and its own commitments, including the ones under the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine; condemns the illegal behaviour of the separatists and Russian forces in eastern Ukraine; supports the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation adopted by the European Council on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 8 September 2014, and believes that the duration of such measures must be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Package of Measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (the so-called Minsk II Agreement"), including the return to existing and internationally recognised borders within the sovereignty of Ukraine ; welcomes the VP/HR's proposals on how to counteract Russia's ongoing campaign of disinformation and propaganda against the European Union ;	16. Reaffirms unwavering support for the Ukrainian people and for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the European choice of Ukraine; unequivocally condemns the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, which has violated the UN Charter, international law and its own commitments, including the ones under the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine; condemns the illegal behaviour of the separatists and Russian forces in eastern Ukraine; supports the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation adopted by the European Council on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 8 September 2014, and believes that the duration of such measures must be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Package of Measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (the so-called Minsk II Agreement"), including the reinstatement of full control of the state border by the government of Ukraine throughout the conflict area ; welcomes the VP/HR's proposals on how to counteract Russia's ongoing campaign of disinformation and propaganda against member states of the European Union ;
40.	IE	16. Reaffirms unwavering support for the Ukrainian people and for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the European choice of Ukraine; unequivocally condemns the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, which has violated the UN Charter, international law and its own commitments, including the ones under the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine; condemns the illegal behaviour of the separatists and Russian forces in eastern Ukraine ; supports the	16. Reaffirms unwavering support for the Ukrainian people and for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the European choice of Ukraine; unequivocally condemns the illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol by Russia, which has violated the UN Charter, international law and its own commitments, including the ones under the Helsinki Final Act of the OSCE and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Ukraine; supports the restrictive measures against the Russian Federation adopted by the European Council on 31 July 2014

		restrictive measures against the Russian Federation adopted by the European Council on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on 8 September 2014, and believes that the duration of such measures must be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Package of Measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (the so-called Minsk II Agreement"), including the return to existing and internationally recognised borders within the sovereignty of Ukraine; welcomes the VP/HR's proposals on how to counteract Russia's ongoing campaign of disinformation and propaganda against the European Union;	and enhanced on 8 September 2014, and believes that the duration of such measures must be clearly linked to the complete implementation of the Package of Measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements (the so-called Minsk II Agreement"), including the return to existing and internationally recognised borders within the sovereignty of Ukraine; welcomes the VP/HR's proposals on how to counteract Russia's ongoing campaign of disinformation and propaganda against the European Union;
41.	IT	17. Urges the EU and Member States to provide logistical support to Ukraine for the implementation of structural reforms and of its commitments under Minsk II; welcomes the Ukrainian government's efforts to date in this regard; further calls on the Ukrainian government to continue such reforms in the interests of good governance, democracy, and the rule of law;	17. Urges the EU and Member States to provide logistical support to Ukraine for the implementation of structural reforms and of its commitments under Minsk II; welcomes the Ukrainian government's efforts to date in this regard; further calls on the Ukrainian government to continue and further intensify such reforms in the interests of good governance, democracy, rule of law, including decentralization ;
42.	PL	17. Urges the EU and Member States to provide logistical support to Ukraine for the implementation of structural reforms and of its commitments under Minsk II; welcomes the Ukrainian government's efforts to date in this regard; further calls on the Ukrainian government to continue such reforms in the interests of good governance, democracy, and the rule of law;	17. Urges the EU and Member States to provide logistical and technical support to Ukraine for the implementation of structural reforms and of its commitments under Minsk agreements ; welcomes the Ukrainian government's efforts to date in this regard; further calls on the Ukrainian government to continue such reforms in the interests of good governance, democracy, and the rule of law;
43.	PL	18. Invites the National Parliaments which have not yet done so, to ratify the Association Agreements/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AA/DCFTA) signed with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, in order to facilitate their timely implementation;	18. Urges the National Parliaments which have not yet done so, to ratify the Association Agreements/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AA/DCFTA) signed with Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, in order to facilitate their timely implementation;
44.	GR	19. Reiterates the European perspective of the Eastern Partnership countries and recalls that in accordance with Article 49 TEU any European country may apply to become a member of the EU provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights ; calls on the VP/HR	19. Reiterates the high importance it attaches to the Eastern Partnership as a specific dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy; the latter remains distinct from the question of EU membership and does not prejudice any possible future developments of partner countries' relationship with the EU ; calls on the VP/HR to develop proposals for

		to develop proposals for cooperation with eligible and willing European Neighbours based on the model of the European Economic Area, which could constitute a further step in their European perspective, be based on enhanced inclusion in the EU area in terms of freedoms and full integration within the common market, and also include closer cooperation in the field of CFSP;	cooperation with eligible and willing Eastern European Neighbours, which could be based on enhanced inclusion in the EU area in terms of freedoms and full integration within the common market, and also include closer cooperation in the field of CFSP;
45.	IT	19. Reiterates the European perspective of the Eastern Partnership countries and recalls that in accordance with Article 49 TEU any European country may apply to become a member of the EU provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights; calls on the VP/HR to develop proposals for cooperation with eligible and willing European Neighbours based on the model of the European Economic Area, which could constitute a further step in their European perspective, be based on enhanced inclusion in the EU area in terms of freedoms and full integration within the common market, and also include closer cooperation in the field of CFSP;	19. Reiterates that in accordance with Article 49 TEU any European country may apply to become a member of the EU provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights; calls on the VP/HR to develop proposals for cooperation with eligible and willing European Neighbours based on the model of the European Economic Area, which should be based on enhanced inclusion in the EU area in terms of freedoms and full integration within the common market, and also include closer cooperation in the field of CFSP;
46.	DE	19. Reiterates the European perspective of the Eastern Partnership countries and recalls that in accordance with Article 49 TEU any European country may apply to become a member of the EU provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights; calls on the VP/HR to develop proposals for cooperation with eligible and willing European Neighbours based on the model of the European Economic Area, which could constitute a further step in their European perspective, be based on enhanced inclusion in the EU area in terms of freedoms and full integration within the common market, and also include closer cooperation in the field of CFSP;	19. Reiterates the European perspective of the Eastern Partnership countries; calls on the VP/HR to develop proposals for cooperation with eligible and willing European Neighbours based on the model of the European Economic Area, which could constitute a further step in their European perspective, be based on enhanced inclusion in the EU area in terms of freedoms and full integration within the common market, and also include closer cooperation in the field of CFSP;

47.	IE	<p>19. Reiterates the European perspective of the Eastern Partnership countries and recalls that in accordance with Article 49 TEU any European country may apply to become a member of the EU provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights; calls on the VP/HR to develop proposals for cooperation with eligible and willing European Neighbours based on the model of the European Economic Area, which could constitute a further step in their European perspective, be based on enhanced inclusion in the EU area in terms of freedoms and full integration within the common market, and also include closer cooperation in the field of CFSP;</p>	<p>19. Recalls that in accordance with Article 49 TEU any European country may apply to become a member of the EU provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights; calls on the VP/HR to develop proposals for cooperation with eligible and willing European Neighbours based on the model of the European Economic Area, which could constitute a further step in their European perspective, be based on enhanced inclusion in the EU area in terms of freedoms and full integration within the common market, and also include closer cooperation in the field of CFSP;</p>
48.	CY	<p>19. Reiterates the European perspective of the Eastern Partnership countries and recalls that in accordance with Article 49 TEU any European country may apply to become a member of the EU provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights; calls on the VP/HR to develop proposals for cooperation with eligible and willing European Neighbours based on the model of the European Economic Area, which could constitute a further step in their European perspective, be based on enhanced inclusion in the EU area in terms of freedoms and full integration within the common market, and also include closer cooperation in the field of CFSP;</p>	<p>Reiterates the European perspective of the Eastern Partnership countries and recalls that in accordance with Article 49 TEU any European country may apply to become a member of the EU provided it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria and the principles of democracy, respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights; notes however that European aspirations of those countries should be addressed keeping in mind that membership will furthermore depend on the absorption capacity of the EU; calls on the VP/HR to develop proposals for cooperation with eligible and willing European Neighbours based on the model of the European Economic Area, which could constitute a further step in their European perspective, be based on enhanced inclusion in the EU area in terms of freedoms and full integration within the common market, and also include closer cooperation in the field of CFSP;</p>
49.	IT	<p>The security implications of climate change</p>	<p><i>Move this title and the paragraphs 20 to 26 after the section “Towards a more coordinated management of migration flows”</i></p>
50.	IE	<p>20. Observes that climate change causes a multiplication of extreme weather events, a shortage of arable land and of drinking water sources in some regions, as well as rises in sea-levels ;</p>	<p>20. Observes that climate change may lead to a multiplication of extreme weather events, a shortage of arable land and of drinking water sources in some regions, as well as rises in sea-levels ;</p>

51.	IE	21. Deplores the human consequences of this development and fears that their escalation leads to an intensification of competition for local resources and to a higher volatility of basic commodity prices, which will result in an increase of climate migration and conflicts likely to destabilise the most vulnerable countries, and therefore considers that climate change represents a major risk to international security;	21. Deplores the human consequences of this development and fears that their escalation may lead to an intensification of competition for local resources and to a higher volatility of basic commodity prices, which may result in an increase of climate migration and conflicts likely to destabilise the most vulnerable countries, and therefore considers that climate change represents a major risk to international security;
52.	IE	22. Calls on the Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the EU and the Commission to make every effort at the Paris Conference (COP21) to reach a legally binding agreement, addressing mitigation, adaptation, financing, technology transfer and capacity building of vulnerable states, in order to keep global warming below 2° Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels, and therefore to mitigate its impact on international security;	22. Calls on the Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the EU and the Commission to make every effort at the Paris Conference (COP21) to reach a legally binding agreement, addressing mitigation, adaptation, financing, technology transfer and capacity building of vulnerable states, in order to keep temperatures within 2° Celsius of pre-industrial levels, and therefore mitigating its impact on international security;
53.	IE	23. Calls on the Member States to honour their commitments and increase their contributions to the Green Climate Fund, which is a promising tool for the mitigation of the impact of climate change on the most vulnerable countries and for the adaptation to its consequences;	23. Calls on the Member States to honour their commitments to the Green Climate Fund, for the mitigation of the impact of climate change on the most vulnerable countries and for the adaptation to its consequences;
54.	IT	24. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service to regularly present detailed analyses on the most vulnerable states to climate change and to suggest preventive actions, which could reinforce their mitigation and capacity of adaptation to climate change and reaction capacities to natural disasters;	24. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service, according to the ambitious post-2020 objectives in the field of climate change and energy policies , to regularly present detailed analyses on the most vulnerable states to climate change and to suggest preventive actions, which could reinforce their mitigation and capacity of adaptation to climate change and reaction capacities to natural disasters;
55.	IT	25. Calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to mainstream the potential effects of climate change on security into the most important strategies, policy documents and financial instruments for external action and CSDP; stresses the need to explore ways of improving energy efficiency and	25. Calls on the VP/HR and the Commission to mainstream the potential effects of climate change on security into the most important strategies, policy documents and financial instruments for external action and CSDP and in particular in the elaboration of the new Security Strategy of the Union;

		environmental management;	
56.	DE	26. Considers that the retreat of Arctic sea ice, which has led to an increased presence of a number of countries in the region, represents a direct security challenge for the EU and calls to reinforce the security component of the reflections on an EU Arctic policy;	26. Considers that the retreat of Arctic sea ice, which has led to a greater international interest in the region, represents a direct security challenge for the EU and calls to reinforce the security component of the reflections on an EU Arctic policy;
57.	IE	26.Considers that the retreat of Arctic sea ice, which has led to an increased presence of a number of countries in the region, represents a direct security challenge for the EU and calls to reinforce the security component of the reflections on an EU Arctic policy;	26.Considers that the retreat of Arctic sea ice, which has led to an increased presence of a number of countries in the region, may represent a security challenge for the EU and calls for consideration of the security component of the reflections on an EU Arctic policy;
58.	GR	27. Notes with concern the increased irregular migration and human trafficking in the Mediterranean region and the significant number of migrants entering the EU from and through the Balkans; urges EU Member States to continue work in all areas by following the European agenda on migration presented by the European Commission;	27. Notes with concern the increased irregular migration and human smuggling and trafficking in the Mediterranean region and the significant number of migrants entering the EU from the Central and, notably, the Eastern Mediterranean, including through the Balkans; urges EU Member States to continue work in all areas on the implementation of the European agenda on migration presented by the European Commission;
59.	IE	27.Notes with concern the increased irregular migration and human trafficking in the Mediterranean region and the significant number of migrants entering the EU from and through the Balkans; urges EU Member States to continue work in all areas by following the European agenda on migration presented by the European Commission;	27.Notes with concern the increased irregular migration and human trafficking in the Mediterranean region and the significant number of migrants entering the EU from and through the Balkans; urges EU Member States to continue work in all areas by following the European agenda on migration presented by the European Commission; it is important that the EU, in conjunction with accommodating refugees in the EU, would also engage in identifying the extent of the circumstances prevailing in the homeland of the refugees with the view to ascertain whether or not it is possible to prevent trafficking and preserve life.
60.	CY		<i>New paragraph 27a: Notes the vulnerability of Mediterranean countries to the particularly harsh effects of climate change in this region, which</i>

			already affect greatly local communities and economies. Expresses concern over the expected additional migration flows in the Mediterranean, which will be directly linked to climate change, putting additional strain on Southern member states and the EU more broadly.
61.	GR		<i>New paragraph 28a:</i> Recalls that it is crucial to reinforce the cooperation between the EU and countries of origin and transit. Notes in particular the need to step up cooperation with Turkey, in view also of the situation in Syria and Iraq, as a significant country of transit;
62.	CY		<i>New paragraph 28b:</i> Expresses deep concern at the increase of migration flows through perilous journeys in the Mediterranean Sea and underlines the need for EU support to member states of the South, which are more affected by this influx; notes that solidarity needs to be demonstrated both towards those member states where migration related strain is more acute and towards asylum seekers arriving in the EU.
63.	GR	<p>29. Calls for increased attention and engagement by the EU and its Member States with regard to the challenges of irregular migration passing through the Western Balkans as well as originating from this region; urges the Commission and the Council to develop proposals on how to deal with asylum seekers from EU applicant countries in the Western Balkans;</p> <p>30. Calls on the Commission and the EEAS to engage in a dialogue with the non-EU countries of the Western Balkans on how to reduce the flow of migrants from these countries and speed up the return of irregular migrants who do not qualify for asylum; emphasises that these issues should be prioritised in the EU's relations with the Western Balkan countries, including within the framework of the EU's enlargement policy;</p>	<p>30. Welcomes, in this context, the upcoming Valetta Conference with African partners, to take place on 11-12 November 2015, aiming at working closely together to tackle illegal migration in an integrated way. It also calls for increased attention and engagement by the EU and its Member States with regard to the challenges of irregular migration passing through the Western Balkans as well as originating from this region; urges the Commission and the Council to develop proposals on how to deal with asylum seekers from EU applicant countries in the Western Balkans and calls on the Commission and the EEAS to engage in a dialogue with the non-EU countries of the Western Balkans on all relevant aspects, including within the framework of the EU's enlargement policy;</p>

64.	PL	29. Calls for increased attention and engagement by the EU and its Member States with regard to the challenges of irregular migration passing through the Western Balkans as well as originating from this region; urges the Commission and the Council to develop proposals on how to deal with asylum seekers from EU applicant countries in the Western Balkans;	29. Calls for increased attention and engagement by the EU and its Member States with regard to the challenges of irregular migration passing through the Western Balkans as well as originating from this region; urges to seek solutions aiming at strengthening the migration and border management capacities of the Western Balkan countries to address and manage mixed movements of migrants and refugees from outside the region and more effectively fight smugglers and traffickers;
65.	PL		<i>New paragraph 30a: Bears in mind the necessity to prepare EU-wide measures aimed at dealing with migratory pressure from other directions, including the East.</i>
66.	GR	31. Stresses that in light of these massive migratory flows, action cannot be limited only to rescue operations and dismantling of criminal networks of smugglers; demands that the EU and Member States develop a common approach based on solidarity and shared responsibility in order to foster better management and coordination of the massive migration flows; urges Member States to quickly implement the measures agreed on at the European Council in June 2015, including the decision to relocate and resettle 60.000 people (to be updated in the light of future developments);	31. Stresses that in light of these massive migratory flows, action cannot be limited only to rescue operations and dismantling of criminal networks of smugglers; requests that the EU and Member States develop a common approach based on solidarity and shared responsibility in order to foster better management and coordination of the massive migration flows; urges Member States to quickly implement the measures agreed on at the European Council in June 2015, including the decision to relocate 40.000 persons in clear need of international protection from Italy and Greece and resettle 20.000 people in clear need of international protection.
67.	UK	31. Stresses that in light of these massive migratory flows, action cannot be limited only to rescue operations and dismantling of criminal networks of smugglers; demands that the EU and Member States develop a common approach based on solidarity and shared responsibility in order to foster better management and coordination of the massive migration flows; urges Member States to quickly implement the measures agreed on at the European Council in June 2015, including the decision to relocate and resettle 60.000 people (to be updated in the light of future developments);	31. Stresses that in light of these massive migratory flows, action cannot be limited only to rescue operations and dismantling of criminal networks of smugglers; demands that the EU and Member States develop a common approach based on solidarity and shared responsibility in order to foster better management and coordination of the massive migration flows, including meeting UN development aid targets to help address these issues at source; urges Member States to quickly implement the measures agreed on at the European Council in June 2015, including the decision to relocate and resettle 60.000 people (to be updated in the light of future developments);

68.	IE	31.Stresses that in light of these massive migratory flows, action cannot be limited only to rescue operations and dismantling of criminal networks of smugglers; demands that the EU and Member States develop a common approach based on solidarity and shared responsibility in order to foster better management and coordination of the massive migration flows; urges Member States to quickly implement the measures agreed on at the European Council in June 2015, including the decision to relocate and resettle 60.000 people (to be updated in the light of future developments);	31.Stresses that in light of these massive migratory flows, action cannot be limited only to rescue operations and dismantling of criminal networks of smugglers; urges that the EU and Member States develop a common approach based on solidarity and shared responsibility in order to foster better management and coordination of the massive migration flows; urges Member States to quickly implement the measures agreed on at the European Council in June 2015, including the decision to relocate and resettle 60.000 people (to be updated in the light of future developments);
69.	SE		<i>New paragraph 31a: Calls the EU to improve the possibilities to legally seek for asylum to the EU.</i>
70.	UK	32. Underlines that the cessation of the conflict in Syria and the stabilisation of the wider MENA region are crucial for reducing migratory flows into the EU; condemns the violence especially of Islamist fighters, particularly against the civilian population; calls for an intensification of pressure for a real political transition in Syria and Libya; supports the need to extend development and humanitarian assistance to Syria, Libya and its neighbouring countries; calls on the EU to contribute to resuming the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, an absolute prerequisite to facilitate stability in the Middle East;	32. Underlines that the cessation of the conflict in Syria and the stabilisation of the wider MENA region are crucial for reducing migratory flows into the EU; condemns the violence especially of Islamist fighters, particularly against the civilian population; calls for an intensification of pressure for a real political transition in Syria and Libya, recognising the need to engage in that process the administrations in Damascus, Tobruk and Tripoli ; supports the need to extend development and humanitarian assistance to Syria, Libya and its neighbouring countries; calls on the EU to contribute to resuming the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, an absolute prerequisite to facilitate stability in the Middle East;
71.	IE	32.Underlines that the cessation of the conflict in Syria and the stabilisation of the wider MENA region are crucial for reducing migratory flows into the EU; condemns the violence especially of Islamist fighters, particularly against the civilian population; calls for an intensification of pressure for a real political transition in Syria and Libya; supports the need to extend development and humanitarian assistance to Syria, Libya and its neighbouring countries; calls on the EU to contribute to resuming the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, an absolute prerequisite to facilitate stability in the Middle East;	32.Underlines that the cessation of the conflict in Syria and the stabilisation of the wider MENA region are crucial for reducing migratory flows into the EU; condemns the violence especially of Islamist fighters, particularly against the civilian population; calls for an intensification of pressure for a real political transition in Syria and Libya; supports the need to extend development and humanitarian assistance to Syria, Libya and its neighbouring countries; calls on the EU to contribute to resuming the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as a prerequisite to facilitate stability in the Middle East;

72.	GR	34. Supports the initiative of the High Representative/Vice-President to initiate a high level dialogue with the main countries of origin of irregular migrants; recalls the need for effective policies on return, readmission and reintegration for people who do not fulfil the conditions required to benefit from international protection; draws the attention of the EU and its Member States to the need to strengthen the dialogue with the African Union in order to develop a common approach on how to address the causes of irregular migration and fight against migrant smuggling;	34. Supports the initiative of the High Representative/Vice-President to initiate a high level dialogue with the main countries of origin of irregular migrants; recalls the need for effective policies on return, readmission and reintegration for people who do not fulfill the conditions required to benefit from international protection; stresses the need for the EU and its Member States to the need to strengthen the dialogue with the African Union in order to develop a common approach on how to address the causes of irregular migration and fight against migrant smuggling;
73.	EP	34. Supports the initiative of the High Representative/Vice-President to initiate a high level dialogue with the main countries of origin of irregular migrants; recalls the need for effective policies on return, readmission and reintegration for people who do not fulfill the conditions required to benefit from international protection; draws the attention of the EU and its Member States to the need to strengthen the dialogue with the African Union in order to develop a common approach on how to address the causes of irregular migration and fight against migrant smuggling;	34. Supports the initiative of the High Representative/Vice-President to initiate a high level dialogue with the main countries of origin of irregular migrants; recalls the need for effective policies on return, readmission and reintegration for people who do not fulfill the conditions required to benefit from international protection; draws the attention of the EU and its Member States to the need to strengthen the dialogue with the African Union in order to develop a common approach on how to address the causes of irregular migration and fight against migrant smuggling; resolves to come back to this issue in the form of a workshop during the next IPC;
74.	GR	35. Recognizes that the EU is facing a growing number of crises around Europe; considers that civilian crisis management has become an important part of the EU's security policy; insists on the importance of civilian instruments in addressing the root causes of the threats currently facing Europe and its partners, including the Early Warning System, the Peace-Building Partnerships, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, and CSDP civilian missions;	35. Recognizes that the EU is facing a growing number of crises around Europe; considers that civilian crisis management has become an important part of the EU's security policy; insists on the importance of EU instruments in addressing the root causes of the threats currently facing Europe and its partners, including the Early Warning System, the Peace-Building Partnerships, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, and CSDP civilian missions;

75.	IT	37. Notices that the most recent civilian missions have continued to be dogged by structural shortfalls, namely inefficiency as regards rapid reaction and too long and inflexible decision-making processes; stresses the need to intensify cooperation in defence and security between the EU and other actors, such as NATO, the United Nations and the United States of America , in order to increase synergies;	37. Notices that the most recent civilian missions have continued to be dogged by structural shortfalls, namely too long and inflexible decision-making processes; stresses the need to intensify cooperation in defence and security between the EU and other actors, such as NATO and the United Nations, in order to increase synergies;
76.	GR	37. Notices that the most recent civilian missions have continued to be dogged by structural shortfalls, namely inefficiency as regards rapid reaction and too long and inflexible decision-making processes; stresses the need to intensify cooperation in defence and security between the EU and other actors, such as NATO, the United Nations and the United States of America, in order to increase synergies;	37. Notices that the most recent civilian missions have continued to be dogged by structural shortfalls, namely inefficiency as regards rapid reaction and too long and inflexible decision-making processes;
77.	GR	38. Recognizes that there is a problem with the recruitment of experts and qualified personnel from Member States for civilian missions; calls in this respect for a Civilian Capability Process, that can enhance the development, availability and initiate the required civilian capabilities, including by enlarging the pool of civilian response teams and urges the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States to set up joint pre-deployment training programmes;	38. Recognizes that there is a problem with the recruitment of experts and qualified personnel from Member States for civilian missions; calls in this respect for the full implementation of the Civilian Capability Development Plan and reiterates the need to enhance the development, availability and generation of the required civilian capabilities, including by enlarging the pool of civilian response teams and urges the VP/HR, the Commission and the Member States to set up joint pre-deployment training programmes;
78.	PL	39. Supports the EU's objectives to respond more quickly to security threats in order to prevent and manage crises more efficiently and this through strengthening civilian capabilities; calls in this regard on the EU to establish a border assistance mission in Tunisia (EUBAM Tunisia) at the Libyan border, to improve the security situation in Tunisia;	39. Supports the EU's objectives to respond more quickly to security threats in order to prevent and manage crises more efficiently and this through strengthening civilian capabilities;
79.	DE	40. Demands that the synergies between the civilian and the military dimension of CSDP be strengthened; calls for civil-military cooperation to be enhanced in areas such as training, infrastructure, logistics, transportation and force protection;	40. Demands that the synergies between the civilian and the military dimension of CSDP be strengthened; calls for civil-military cooperation to be enhanced in areas such as training, infrastructure, logistics, transportation planning and conduct and force protection;
80.	IT		<i>New paragraph 40a: Stress the importance of developing further synergies between CSDP, in both its civilian and military dimensions, and</i>

			Freedom, Security and Justice actors, notably the EU agencies (EDA, Europol, FRONTEX and CEPOL) and Interpol, by <i>inter alia</i> building on the frameworks of co-operation signed between the EEAS, FRONTEX and Europol as well as between the EEAS and the European Gendarmerie Force.
81.	EE	41. Takes note of the conclusions of the European Council of 25-26 June 2015; regrets that the conclusions failed to inject new political stimulus in matters of security and defence; considers that this lack of ambition is a worrying sign of a lack of political will in spite of the ever closer threats and challenges that face us;	41. Takes note of the conclusions of the European Council of 25-26 June 2015; regrets that the conclusions failed to inject new political stimulus in matters of security and defence; considers that this lack of ambition is a worrying sign of a lack of political will in spite of the ever closer threats and challenges that face us; to keep the momentum the Council should revert to CSDP no later than December 2016.
82.	GR		<i>New paragraph 41a: Stresses the importance of enabling the EU to assume increased responsibilities as a security provider, at international and regional levels.</i>
83.	UK	42. Calls on the European Council to deal extensively with security and defence and to have an in-depth discussion on the shortcomings in the implementation of the commitments taken by the European Council in 2013; calls on the European Council to prove its willingness to implement past decisions in order to improve the EU's defence capabilities, to present proposals on reforming the financial arrangements for CSDP missions and operations, to maintain and consolidate the European Defence Agency and to provide support for a common industrial and technological base;	42. Calls on the European Council to deal extensively with security and defence and to have an in-depth discussion on the shortcomings in the implementation of the commitments taken by the European Council in 2013; calls on the European Council to prove its willingness to implement past decisions in order to improve the EU's defence capabilities, including by meeting the 2% of GDP spending guideline for those Member States that are members of NATO ; to present proposals on reforming the financial arrangements for CSDP missions and operations, to maintain and consolidate the European Defence Agency and to provide support for a common industrial and technological base;
84.	EP		<i>New paragraph 44a: Decides to conduct a workshop on the topic of arms exports during the next IPC in The Hague;</i>

85.	EE	44. Urges the Member States and the Commission to deliver on the commitments made at the European Council of 19-20 December 2013 and to invest more resources in a common defence; calls for greater solidarity among Member States in funding CSDP missions and operations;	44. Urges the Member States and the Commission to deliver on the commitments made at the European Council of 19-20 December 2013 and to invest more resources in a common defence; calls for greater solidarity among Member States in funding CSDP missions and operations; notes that the European Council recalled the need for the Member States to allocate a sufficient level of expenditure for defence;
86.	NL	44. Urges the Member States and the Commission to deliver on the commitments made at the European Council of 19-20 December 2013 and to invest more resources in a common defence; calls for greater solidarity among Member States in funding CSDP missions and operations;	44. Urges the Member States and the Commission to deliver on the commitments made at the European Council of 19-20 December 2013 and to invest more resources in a common defence; calls for greater solidarity among Member States in funding CSDP missions and operations; encourages the European Council, in future discussions on security and defence, to find a constructive and permanent solution for financial arrangements of EU Battlegroups deployment based on the ATHENA mechanism provisions; calls on the HR/VP to build on the June European Council Conclusions and the conclusions of this conference in relation to the subject of how to improve the EU's rapid response forces; decides to follow-up on the subject of political decision-making in the area of security and defence at the next IPC in The Netherlands in April 2016;
87.	SE	44. Urges the Member States and the Commission to deliver on the commitments made at the European Council of 19-20 December 2013 and to invest more resources in a common defence ; calls for greater solidarity among Member States in funding CSDP missions and operations;	44. Urges the Member States and the Commission to deliver on the commitments made at the European Council of 19-20 December 2013 and to invest more resources deepened EU-cooperation ; calls for greater solidarity among Member States in funding CSDP missions and operations;”
88.	EE		<i>New paragraph 45a: Welcomes the conclusion of the European Council to mobilise EU instruments to help counter hybrid threats and looks forward to harnessing the potential of the EEAS, the EDA and the Commission to foster the resilience of Member States and partners, bearing in mind the necessity to deepen EU-NATO cooperation and take complimentary action.</i>
89.	EE		<i>New paragraph 45b: Considers that cyber defence needs more attention in the EU, including situational awareness, exercises and training ;</i>

90.	IE	45. Calls on the Council and the Commission to take decisions that will lead to an improvement in the capacity of the Union and the Member States as regards territorial defence, in complementarity with NATO, and as regards the capacity to respond to internal security challenges;	<p>45. Recalls, after the European Council of December 2013, that CSDP will continue to develop in full complementarity with NATO in the framework of the strategic partnership between both organisations and in full, reciprocal autonomy, taking into account the fact that not all EU Member States are NATO Member States and that they participate under the conditions set out in their respective national constitutions;</p> <p>Calls on the Council and the Commission to take decisions that will lead to an improvement in the capacity of the Union and the Member States as regards territorial defence, in complementarity with NATO, and as regards the capacity to respond to internal security challenges;</p>
91.	PL	48. Calls on the Member States to fully implement the unused provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in the area of security and defence, in particular Article 42(6) TEU (permanent structured cooperation) and Article 44 TEU (entrusting of a CSDP mission or operation to a group of Member States); urges the HR/VP to actively promote these instruments and their implementation.	48. Calls on the Member States to fully implement the unused provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in the area of security and defence, in particular Article 42(6) TEU (permanent structured cooperation) and Article 44 TEU (entrusting of a CSDP mission or operation to a group of Member States); urges the HR/VP to actively promote discussion on Article 44 TEU in purpose to clear all objections leading to full implementation of this instrument.
92.	EP	48. Calls on the Member States to fully implement the unused provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in the area of security and defence, in particular Article 42(6) TEU (permanent structured cooperation) and Article 44 TEU (entrusting of a CSDP mission or operation to a group of Member States); urges the VP/HR to actively promote these instruments and their implementation.	48. Calls on the Member States to fully implement the unused provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in the area of security and defence, in particular Article 42(6) TEU (permanent structured cooperation) and Article 44 TEU (entrusting of a CSDP mission or operation to a group of Member States); urges the VP/HR to actively promote these instruments and their implementation; resolves to dedicate a workshop to the issue of permanent structured cooperation during the next IPC in The Hague.

93.	IT		<i>New paragraph 48a:</i> In this perspective considers that the implementation of the new military Rapid Response Concept could be very useful in order to provide a broader and more modular approach to the EU's rapid response capabilities and reaffirms that the EU Battlegroups (EU BGs) remain the EU's primary military rapid reaction tool and they have to be routinely taken into consideration during the planning process of CSDP operations/missions as an option in crisis situations requiring prompt action.
94.	IT		<i>New paragraph 48b:</i> Calls the EEAS to consider to entrust the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate to evaluate the eventual need of alternative procedures for the elaboration of Crisis Management Concept for the EU missions undertaken under Article 42(6)TEU and Article 44 TEU.
95.	DE		<i>New paragraph 48c:</i> Considering the necessity to integrate the national defense industries into a European Defense Industry, calls for discussions on the role of the European Defense Market and the role of the EU's "Common position on arms exports control" in a competitive international environment calls for the European arms exports to be discussed at one of the next Interparliamentary Conferences on CFSP/CSDP.

Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the CFSP and the CSDP – 5 & 6 September 2015

States, Parliaments/Chambers and corresponding codes

AUSTRIA, bicameral	AT	LATVIA, unicameral	LV
<i>Nationalrat</i>	(NR)	LITHUANIA, unicameral	LT
<i>Bundesrat</i>	(BR)	LUXEMBOURG, unicameral	LU
BELGIUM, bicameral	BE	MALTA, unicameral	MT
<i>Chambre des Représentants</i>	(C)	NETHERLANDS, bicameral	NL
<i>Sénat</i>	(S)	<i>Eerste Kamer</i>	(EK)
BULGARIA, unicameral	BG	<i>Tweede Kamer</i>	(TK)
CROATIA, unicameral	HR	POLAND, bicameral	PL
CYPRUS, unicameral	CY	<i>Sejm</i>	(SJ)
CZECH REPUBLIC, bicameral	CZ	<i>Senát</i>	(SE)
<i>Poslanecká sněmovna</i>	(PS)	PORTUGAL, unicameral	PT
<i>Senát</i>	(S)	ROMANIA, bicameral	RO
DENMARK, unicameral	DK	<i>Camera Deputaţilor</i>	(C)
ESTONIA, unicameral	EE	<i>Senatul</i>	(S)
FINLAND, unicameral	FI	SLOVAKIA, unicameral	SK
FRANCE, bicameral	FR	SLOVENIA, bicameral	SI
<i>Assemblée nationale</i>	(AN)	<i>Državni zbor</i>	(DZ)
<i>Sénat</i>	(S)	<i>Državni svet</i>	(DS)
GERMANY, bicameral	DE	SPAIN, bicameral	ES
<i>Bundestag</i>	(BT)	<i>Congreso de los Diputados</i>	(C)
<i>Bundesrat</i>	(BR)	<i>Senado</i>	(S)
GREECE, unicameral	GR	SWEDEN, unicameral	SE
HUNGARY, unicameral	HU	UNITED KINGDOM, bicameral	R-U
IRELAND, bicameral	IE	<i>House of Commons</i>	(HC)
<i>Dáil</i>	(D)	<i>House of Lords</i>	(HL)
<i>Senate</i>	(S)		
ITALY, bicameral	IT	European Parliament	EP
<i>Camera dei deputati</i>	(C)		
<i>Senato della Repubblica</i>	(S)		