



**40<sup>th</sup>**

Bi-annual Report  
**Developments in  
European Union  
Procedures and Practices Relevant  
to  
Parliamentary Scrutiny**

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based on the replies to a questionnaire distributed to Parliaments/Chambers.

## **Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union**

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## Table of Contents

<b>BACKGROUND</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>ABSTRACT</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN RELATION TO THE EUROPEAN GOAL OF OPEN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN HANDLING ENERGY POLICIES: RENEWABLE SOURCES OF ENERGY</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>CHAPTER 3</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS WHEN CONFRONTED WITH RUSSIA’S INVASION OF UKRAINE</b>	<b>23</b>



## BACKGROUND

This is the Fortieth Bi-annual Report from the COSAC Secretariat.

### COSAC Bi-annual Reports

The XXX COSAC decided that the COSAC Secretariat should produce factual Bi-annual Reports, to be published ahead of each ordinary meeting of the Conference. The purpose of the Reports is to give an overview of the developments in procedures and practices in the European Union that are relevant to parliamentary scrutiny.

All the Bi-annual Reports are available on the IPEX website, either by accessing this [overview](#) or by navigating to the respective [meeting](#).

The three chapters of this Bi-annual Report are based on information provided by the national Parliaments of the European Union Member States and the European Parliament. The deadline for submitting replies to the questionnaire for the 40th Bi-annual Report was 20 October 2023.

The outline of this Report was adopted by the meeting of the Chairpersons of COSAC, held on 18 September 2023, in Madrid.

As a general rule, the Report does not refer to all Parliaments or Chambers that have responded to a given question. Instead, illustrative examples are used.

Please note that, in some cases, respondents are able to provide more than one answer to multiple choice questions. This may explain any perceived disparity in the total number of answers to a question and the total number of respondents can thus be accounted for.

Complete replies, received from 39 national Parliaments/Chambers of 27 Member States and of the European Parliament, can be found in the Annex on the [COSAC webpage](#) on the IPEX website.

### Note on Numbers

Of the 27 Member States of the European Union, 15 have a unicameral Parliament and 12 have a bicameral Parliament. Due to this combination of unicameral and bicameral systems, there are 39 national parliamentary Chambers in the 27 Member States of the European Union.

Although they have bicameral systems, the national Parliaments of Austria, Ireland and Spain each submit a single set of replies to the questionnaire, therefore the maximum number of respondents per question is 37, including the European Parliament. There were 37 responses to the questionnaire.

# ABSTRACT

## CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN RELATION TO THE EUROPEAN GOAL OF OPEN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

The first chapter of the 40<sup>th</sup> Bi-annual Report of COSAC seeks to assess the role of Parliaments/Chambers in relation to the European goal of open strategic autonomy, either by scrutinising legislative proposals related to the concept or by monitoring the national Government's positions in the Council of the European Union and the European Council.

All Parliaments/Chambers replied that they had dealt with open strategic autonomy in some of its dimensions by different parliamentary tools, but none replied that they had set up a special Committee. Most of the debates held on open strategic autonomy had taken place at Committee level, rather than in the plenary or via other parliamentary bodies.

The three areas of the European goal of open strategic autonomy that have been deemed more relevant by Parliaments/Chambers answering this question have been energy, security and defence and industry. Amongst the tools foreseen within the Global Gateway Strategy, the most debated one was the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)-Global Europe, even if 25 Parliaments/Chambers did not debate specifically any of the referred tools.

When asked whether any of a pre-selected set of legislative proposals related to the concept of open strategic autonomy had been considered during the last year (2022), the two most relevant initiatives were *“the Critical raw materials Act”* and *“the Artificial intelligence Act”*. The most common means through which consideration of proposals related to open strategic autonomy were implemented were through *“debate at Committee level”* and by *“scrutinising specific legislative proposals”*. Nine Parliaments/Chambers had debated proposals related to the concept of open strategic autonomy in the Chamber.

All Parliaments/Chambers replied when asked about their handling of two specific initiatives – *“Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP)”* and *“European Defence Industrial Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA)”* – both aiming at attaining more open strategic autonomy in the field of security and defence. Replies showed that 13 Parliaments/Chambers had debated both proposals, while 15 indicated that they had not held any debates on these specific initiatives. When asked to indicate the means through which that scrutiny was implemented, the two most relevant were *“Debate at Committee level”* and *“By scrutinising specific legislative proposals”*.

Nineteen respondents indicated they had handled at least one of the pre-identified initiatives in the context of the diversification of the trade relations of the European Union (the *“EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement”*, the *“EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement”* or the *“EU-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement”*). Half of those nineteen Parliaments/Chambers have handled initiatives related to all three trade agreements. Sixteen Parliaments/Chambers replied that none of these initiatives had been dealt with.

The subject of trade relations was mostly discussed at Committee level, but some Parliaments/Chambers also reported a debate in Plenary. These debates led to the *“adoption of a*



*resolution*” in five Parliament/Chambers and to a *“negotiating mandate for the Government”* in another five Parliaments/Chambers. Only one parliament reported that the debates have led to both the *“adoption of a resolution”* and a *“negotiating mandate for the Government”*. Two Parliaments/Chambers also scrutinised specific legislative proposals.

The vast majority of Parliaments/Chambers signalled that no official delegation or mission had been sent to any potential partner for a trade agreement in the last year.

## CHAPTER 2: THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN HANDLING ENERGY POLICIES: RENEWABLE SOURCES OF ENERGY

The second chapter of the 40<sup>th</sup> Bi-annual Report seeks to assess how and when Parliaments/Chambers have been involved in scrutinising measures and legislative proposals in the framework of the green transition, with special emphasis in the energy field, in the promotion of renewable sources of energy and in the implementation of the EU's RePowerEU plan.

An overwhelmingly majority of Parliaments/Chambers scrutinised the legislative proposals preselected within this chapter (*“Proposal on the revision of the Electricity Market Design”*, *“Proposal for a recast Directive on gas markets and hydrogen”*, *“Proposal for a recast Regulation on gas markets and hydrogen”*, and *“Proposal on the revision of EU's protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market rules”*).

When asked to precise how that oversight took place, the majority mentioned *“debates at Committee level”*, followed by the scrutiny of *“the specific legislative proposals”* and, to a lesser extent, by adopting a *“negotiating mandate for the Government”* or by *“adopting a resolution”*. Only a limited number held debates at the Plenary on these proposals.

A substantial number of Parliaments/Chambers also replied affirmatively when asked if they had debated or approved an initiative regarding a set of European Union policies aimed at boosting renewable energy. A large majority did so regarding the *“Permits for new or adapted renewable energy power plants to be issued faster, including solar panels and windmills”* and the *“Measures aimed at promoting the production of hydrogen by renewable electricity”*, whereas a little less than half did so for the *“Measures aimed at promoting offshore renewable energy sources, besides wind, such as tidal and wave power, floating solar energy and algae for biofuels”* and on the *“EU solar energy strategy”*.

Asked to further detail how that scrutiny occurred, a majority indicated *“debates at Committee level”* and a little more than half mentioned *“debates at the Plenary”*. A fewer number of respondents noted they had *“scrutinised specific legislative proposals”* or *“adopted a resolution”*, with a small number stating they had issued a *“negotiating mandate for the Government”*. A few Parliaments/Chambers also provided additional information of the scope of this Chapter, detailed in the respective section below.

### CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENTS WHEN CONFRONTED WITH RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE

The third chapter of the 40th Bi-annual report seeks to highlight the role and activities of Parliaments/Chambers in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The questions address different angles of this role, ranging from scrutinising Council conclusions, the position regarding EU sanctions on Russia, Ukraine's accession to the European Union, or the discussion of the future reconstruction of Ukraine.

Different formats were used for discussions on Ukraine, with the Foreign Affairs and the European Affairs Committees as the most used Parliamentary Committees for discussion. A very large majority of Parliaments/Chambers also held debates on Ukraine in a Plenary session. Other formats used by Parliaments/Chambers to debate Ukraine include *ad hoc* bilateral relations and *ad hoc* multilateral meetings.

A majority of the Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they had scrutinised Council conclusions in relation to Ukraine. The most widely used ways were "*Debate at Committee level*", and "*Debate in the Parliament/ Chamber*". Other forms of scrutiny used by various Parliaments/Chambers include "*adopting a negotiating mandate for the Government*" and the "*adoption of a resolution*".

Asked whether they had adopted a position on Ukraine's accession to the European Union, a slight majority of Parliaments/Chambers replied "yes". Almost all of those Parliaments/Chambers that had replied affirmatively, indicated that they had held a "*debate at Committee level*". This was in various cases combined with other formats such as "*debate in the Parliament/Chamber*", or "*adopting a resolution*". Other respondents indicated that they had "*adopted a negotiating mandate for the Government*", whereas the "*scrutiny of specific legislative proposals*" and "*adopting a political declaration*" were methods used by the fewer number of Parliaments/Chambers for adopting a position on Ukraine's accession to the European Union.

A majority of Parliament/Chambers had also adopted a position on the sanctions approved by the Council of the European Union on Russia. On this question, a "*debate at Committee level*" was also the format most widely used, with numerous respondents indicating that this was done in combination with a "*debate in the Parliament/Chamber*". The "*adoption of a resolution*" was indicated as the chosen format by a majority of respondents, almost as many as the "*debate at Committee level*". "*Adopting a negotiating mandate for the Government*", and "*scrutinising specific legislative proposals*" were chosen only by a small number of respondents.

The last question asked Parliaments/Chambers whether they had debated the future reconstruction of Ukraine. More than three quarters of the Parliaments/Chambers answered affirmatively. Half of those respondents debated the topic "*in the Parliament/Chamber*", while a larger number debated the topic "*at Committee level*". A third of the respondents "*adopted a resolution*" on the matter, whereas only a smaller number adopted a "*negotiating mandate for the Government*" or "*scrutinised specific legislative proposals*".

The last section of the Chapter provides comparative tables indicating the number of Parliaments/Chambers that held different debates, took different actions, or a combination of these on the different topics asked by the preceding questions regarding Ukraine.

# CHAPTER 1

## THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN RELATION TO THE EUROPEAN GOAL OF OPEN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY

THE FIRST CHAPTER OF THE 39<sup>TH</sup> BI-ANNUAL REPORT seeks to assess what role Parliaments/Chambers have played in relation to the European goal of open strategic autonomy.

**1.1** When asked whether a special Committee had been created in their Parliament/Chamber in order to deal with open strategic autonomy, in any of its dimensions, all Parliaments/Chambers responded negatively (37 out of 37).

**1.2** When asked whether their Parliament/Chamber adopted a position that had put open strategic autonomy forward as a general EU and/or national objective, notably ahead of the European Council meeting on 26-27 October 2023, 10 Parliaments/Chambers answered “yes”, 22 answered “no”, three Parliaments/Chambers replied “*not applicable*” and one did not reply to this question. As a follow up, the 10 Parliaments/Chambers which replied affirmatively were asked to specify at what level that position had been adopted, by choosing from a set of predefined alternatives with multiple choices allowed. The replies were distributed as follows:

WAY OF SCRUTINY	REPLY
<i>Debate in the Parliament/Chamber<sup>1</sup></i>	4
<i>Debate at Committee level</i>	4
<i>By adopting a resolution</i>	6
<i>By adopting a negotiating mandate for the Government</i>	3
<i>By scrutinising specific legislative proposals</i>	3
<i>Other</i>	2
Total respondents	11

<sup>1</sup> The term “debate in the Chamber”, in this context of this type of questions and hereinafter, should be read as “debate in the Plenary”.

Among the Parliaments/Chambers which opted for "other", the Finnish *Eduskunta* specified that its Grand Committee had not adopted any specific opinion concentrating solely on open strategic autonomy but had stressed its importance on various occasions. The French *Sénat* specified that the position on strategic autonomy had been adopted in the framework of a resolution and by scrutinising specific legislative proposals. Amongst the other options, the French *Sénat* mentioned that an information report on the "*European defence: the challenge of strategic autonomy*"<sup>2</sup>, made on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense and armed forces of the French *Sénat*, had been filed on July 3, 2019.

The Dutch *Eerste Kamer* precised that it is kept informed about the goal of open strategic autonomy. Given the fact that within the Dutch bicameral parliamentary system the Senate's main focus is on legislation, it is therefore uncommon to adopt resolutions of this nature.

The European Affairs Committee of the Italian *Senato della Repubblica* is conducting a thorough consideration of the EU trade agreements with third countries, given the fact they create important economic opportunities and ensure a secure supply of critical raw materials. The focus has been put on trade agreements (in force or potential) with India, Japan, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, Chile, Mexico.

The Belgian *Chambre des représentants/Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers* added that various motions for resolutions on the EU-Mercosur Agreement were being examined at that time by the Committee on External Relations. Two motions for resolutions had also been rejected by the referred committee on the free trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur.

The Swedish *Riksdag* precised that their Prime Minister was consulting the Committee on EU Affairs ahead of the European Council meeting of 26–27 October. The Government usually seeks a mandate for the Council conclusions which are presented a few days prior to meetings. A report back to the Riksdag generally takes place in the Chamber. Another precision made by the Swedish *Riksdag*, as regards their responses "*Debate at Committee level*", include information from and deliberations with the Government in the Committee, as well as consultations with the Government in the Committee on EU Affairs (this comment applies to all chapters).

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<sup>2</sup> Report n° 626 (2018-2019) by Mr Ronan LE GLEUT and Ms Hélène CONWAY-MOURET.


**1.3** When asked which areas of the open strategic autonomy would be deemed more relevant given the current global geopolitical landscape, the replies of the 37 respondents were distributed as follows:

MORE RELEVANT AREAS OF THE OPEN STRATEGIC AUTONOMY	REPLY
<i>Security and defence</i>	24
<i>Industry</i>	20
<i>Trade</i>	15
<i>Energy</i>	25
<i>Finance</i>	10
<i>Not applicable</i>	9
<i>Other</i>	3
Total respondents	37

Among the Parliaments/Chambers which opted for "other", the Italian *Senato della Repubblica* identified Artificial Intelligence as another area of the open strategic autonomy, and the European Parliament specified the economic governance framework, food systems and food security as areas of further relevance with that regard.

**1.4** All Parliaments/Chambers provided replies when asked which tools foreseen within the Global Gateway Strategy had been debated, as illustrated in the chart below.

Which tools of the "Global Gateway" Strategy have been debated in your Parliament/Chamber? Quels instruments de la «Global Gateway» ont été débattus au sein de votre Parlement/Chambre?



**1.4.1** As a follow up, Parliaments/Chambers which replied affirmatively, were asked to specify at what level that debate had taken place, by choosing from a set of predefined alternatives with multiple choices allowed. Among the 16 Parliaments/Chambers who replied to this question, the following seven mentioned they had debated in the Chamber: Austrian *Nationalrat and Bundesrat*, Czech *Senát*, German *Bundestag*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, and the European Parliament, whereas an overwhelming majority (15 out of 16) had debated at Committee level. An equal number (five respondents) had either adopted a resolution, scrutinised specific legislative proposals, or adopted a negotiation mandate for the Government.

The table below contains a summary of provided answers from the 16 Parliaments/Chambers which answered this question:

WAY OF SCRUTINY	REPLY
<i>Debate in the Parliament/Chamber</i>	7
<i>Debate at Committee level</i>	15

<i>By adopting a resolution</i>	5
<i>By adopting a negotiating mandate for the Government</i>	5
<i>By scrutinising specific legislative proposals</i>	5
<i>Other</i>	2
Total respondents	16

The Italian *Camera dei Deputati* was one of the Parliaments/Chambers which opted for “*Other*” and specified that the EU Policies Committee was conducting a series of hearings with representatives of the Western Balkan countries in the context of the EU’s enlargement process. The European Parliament also opted for “*Other*”, and specified that public hearings had been conducted, and that work was ongoing on a report on the implementation of NDICI-Global Europe.

**1.5** Parliaments/Chambers were inquired whether any of a pre-selected set of legislative proposals related to the concept of open strategic autonomy had been considered during the last year (2022), with multiple choices allowed. If so, they were asked to specify which of those proposal(s) were considered, as highlighted in the table below:

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL	REPLY
<i>Critical raw materials Act</i>	28
<i>Artificial intelligence Act</i>	28
<i>Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (‘STEP’)</i>	22
<i>European Chips Act</i>	23
<i>Proposal on instant credit transfers in euro (“instant payments”)</i>	23

<i>Digital Euro, and within this package, more specifically, the following two proposals:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>Legislative proposal establishing the legal framework for a possible digital euro as a complement to euro banknotes and coins</i></li> <li>- <i>Legislative proposal on the legal tender of euro cash</i></li> </ul>	19
<i>Total respondents</i>	33

The Belgian *Sénat/Senaat* provided additional information, stating that issues linked to the concept of strategic autonomy were regularly discussed in the Federal advisory committee on EU Affairs. The Swedish *Riksdag* also highlighted that the Committee on Finance had conducted subsidiarity checks of the “*proposal on instant credits transfers in euro*”<sup>3</sup>, and on the “*proposal on digital euro services by payment services providers incorporated in Member States whose currency is not the euro*”<sup>4</sup>. The Swedish *Riksdag* further noted that no subsidiarity check had been conducted for the “*proposal on the establishment of the digital euro*”<sup>5</sup> and on the “*proposal on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins*”<sup>6</sup>, mentioned in question 1.5, as these only applied to countries belonging to the euro area.

The Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon* added that a considerable number of the above-mentioned proposals were scheduled to be debated at a committee level in the forthcoming period.

**1.5.1** Asked to indicate, with multiple choices allowed, the means through which consideration of proposals related to the concept of open strategic autonomy were implemented, the two most common were through a “*debate at Committee level*” (32 replies) and by “*scrutinising specific legislative proposals*” (21 replies). Less common were by “*adopting a resolution*” (10 replies). Nine of the Parliaments/Chambers had “*debated in the Chamber*”, and an equal number had adopted a “*negotiating mandate for the Government*”.

The table below contains a summary of provided answers from the 33 respondents to this question:

WAY OF SCRUTINY	REPLY
<i>Debate in the Chamber</i>	9
<i>Debate at the Committee level</i>	32
<i>By adopting a resolution</i>	10

<sup>3</sup> COM(2022) 546

<sup>4</sup> COM(2023) 368

<sup>5</sup> COM(2023) 369

<sup>6</sup> COM (2023) 364




<i>By adopting a negotiation mandate for the Government</i>	9
<i>By scrutinising specific legislative proposals</i>	21
<i>Other, please specify</i>	1
<i>Total respondents</i>	33

The Croatian *Hrvatski sabor* replied “Other”, and specified that it had considered proposals related to the concept of open strategic autonomy by adopting a conclusion on a national position at Committee level.

**1.6** Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they had debated the “*Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP)*” and/or the “*European Defence Industrial Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA)*”, both proposals aiming at attaining more open strategic autonomy. Multiple choices were allowed and replies showed that a little more than half of all Parliaments/Chambers had debated ASAP (19 out of 37), and almost half had debated EDIRPA (16 out of 37), while 15 respondents indicated that they had not held any debates on these specific proposals.

The following 13 Parliaments/Chambers replied that they had debated both proposals: Danish *Folketing*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, French *Sénat*, German *Bundestag*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Latvian *Saeima*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Romanian *Senat*, Slovak *Národná rada*, Swedish *Riksdag* and the European Parliament. The chart below contains a summary of the answers provided:

Open strategic autonomy: has your Parliament/Chamber debated any of the following proposals?  
Autonomie stratégique plus ouverte: votre Parlement/Chambre a-t-il débattu aucune des propositions suivantes?



**1.6.1** Parliaments/Chambers which had replied that they had debated either one or both of the proposals (*ASAP* and *EDIRPA*) were asked, with multiple choices allowed, in which form those debates took place.

The most common way of considering these proposals was through “*debates at Committee level*”, (19 out of 22), followed by those Parliaments/Chambers who replied that they had “*scrutinised specific legislative proposals*” (11). Seven of the Parliaments/Chambers “*adopted a negotiating mandate for the Government*”, and six replied that they had “*debated in the Chamber*”. A less common form of considering these proposals was by “*adopting a resolution*”, which five Parliaments/Chambers had done.


The table below contains a summary of provided answers to this question:

WAY OF SCRUTINY	REPLY
<i>Debate in the Parliament/Chamber</i>	6
<i>Debate at Committee level</i>	19
<i>By adopting a resolution</i>	5
<i>By adopting a negotiating mandate for the Government</i>	7
<i>By scrutinising specific legislative proposals</i>	11
<i>Other. Please specify.</i>	0
<i>Total respondents</i>	22

**1.7** Nineteen out of 36 Parliaments/Chambers indicated they had handled at least one of the pre-identified initiatives in the context of the diversification of the trade relations of the European Union (the “*EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement*”, the “*EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement*” or the “*EU-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement*”). Sixteen replied that none of these initiatives had been dealt with.

Only eight Parliaments/Chambers have handled initiatives related to all three trade agreements (the Estonian *Riigikogu*, the Finnish *Eduskunta*, the German *Bundestag*, the Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, the Latvian *Saeima*, the Spanish *Cortes Generales*, the Swedish *Riksdag* and the European Parliament).

Has your Parliament handled any initiative related to any of the following trade agreements?  
 Votre Parlement a-t-il pris en charge une initiative liée à l'un des accords commerciaux suivants?



**1.7.1** When asked to specify how these trade agreements were handled within the Parliament/Chamber, with multiple choices allowed, 15 out of 21 respondents replied that debates were held at “Committee level”. Six respondents also reported a “debate in the Parliament/Chamber”.

These debates led to the “adoption of a resolution” in five Parliament/Chambers: the Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, the French *Assemblée Nationale* and *Sénat*, the German *Bundestag* and the European Parliament. In another five Parliaments/Chambers, these debates led to a “negotiating mandate for the Government”: the Estonian *Riigikogu*, the Finnish *Eduskunta*, the Latvian *Saeima*, the Slovenian *Državni zbor*, and the Swedish *Riksdag*. The Austrian Parliament is the only parliament where the debates have led to both the “adoption of a resolution” and a “negotiating mandate for the Government”. The Belgian *Chambre des représentants/Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers* and the European Parliament also scrutinised specific legislative proposals.

WAY OF SCRUTINY	REPLY
<i>Debate in the Parliament/Chamber</i>	6
<i>Debate at Committee level</i>	15
<i>By adopting a resolution</i>	6
<i>By adopting a negotiating mandate for the Government</i>	6

WAY OF SCRUTINY	REPLY
<i>Debate in the Parliament/Chamber</i>	6
<i>By scrutinising specific legislative proposals</i>	2
<i>Other. Please specify.</i>	5
<i>Total respondents</i>	21

The Belgian *Chambre des Représentants/Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers* and *Sénat/Senaat* mentioned that these topics were regularly discussed in the common Federal advisory committee on European Affairs. Various motions for resolutions on the EU-Mercosur Agreement were examined by the Committee on External Relations in the Belgian *Chambre des Représentants/Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers*. However, two motions for resolutions were rejected by the committee: a motion for a resolution on the free trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur<sup>7</sup> and a motion for a resolution to reject the free trade agreement with Mercosur<sup>8</sup>.

The Italian *Senato della Repubblica* specified that its European Union Policies Committee was conducting a thorough consideration of the EU trade agreements with third countries, since it considers they create important economic opportunities and a close dialogue with countries that share the same economic interests and political values. This was considered key to establishing global networks and ensuring a secure supply of critical raw materials. The focus has been put on trade agreements (in force or potential) with India, Japan, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, Chile and Mexico.

The Spanish *Cortes Generales* further reported written questions from the *Congreso de los Diputados* to the Spanish Government on:

- the ratification of the Free Trade Agreements (FTA): more specifically, a report was requested to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, on the possible impact of the EU-Mexico trade agreement on the Spanish agricultural and food sectors;
- the economic impact that the agreement between Mercosur and the European Union may have on the Spanish primary sector, and on the timeline provided for in the agreement signed by the European Union and Mercosur for the removal of custom duties;
- the measures taken to fulfil Spain's commitment in relation to the proposals relating to Latin America and the Caribbean of the "implementation of a multidimensional strategy to strengthen the relationship between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean, including the continued effort for ratification of the EU-MERCOSUR Agreement and the modernization of the agreements with Mexico and Chile", since the approval of Spain's Foreign Action Strategy 2021-2024.

<sup>7</sup> (DOC 55 3253/001)

<sup>8</sup> (DOC 55 980/001)

The Swedish *Riksdag* mentioned receiving fairly regular, topical information from the Government about ongoing FTA negotiations (Committee on Industry and Trade).

The European Parliament reported having organised public hearings on the matter.

**1.8** As a follow-up on the previous question in relation to the trade relations of the EU, respondents were asked if an official delegation or mission to any potential partner for a trade agreement had been sent by their Parliament/Chamber in the last year. The vast majority of Parliaments/Chambers (26 out of 35) replied negatively.

The Croatian *Hrvatski sabor* and the Danish *Folketing* noted that delegations of the European Affairs Committees had been sent, whereas the Estonian *Riigikogu* and the Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna* reported that delegations of the Foreign Affairs Committees had performed such missions. Finally, the Spanish *Cortes Generales* and the European Parliament sent a delegation of the respective Trade Committees.

HAS YOUR PARLIAMENT/CHAMBER SENT AN OFFICIAL DELEGATION OR MISSION TO ANY POTENTIAL PARTNER FOR A TRADE AGREEMENT IN THE LAST YEAR?	REPLY
<i>Yes, a delegation of the Foreign Affairs Committee</i>	2
<i>Yes, a delegation of the Trade Committee</i>	2
<i>Yes, a delegation of the European Affairs Committee</i>	2
<i>No / Non</i>	26
<i>Other</i>	6
<i>Total respondents</i>	35

**1.8.1** The Parliaments/Chambers who replied affirmatively to the previous question, were asked to specify the destination and the aim of such missions.

The following Parliaments/Chambers specified the countries that were visited for trade negotiations or for the negotiating of trade agreements: the Croatian *Hrvatski sabor* (Indonesia), the Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna* (Chile, Uruguay, México and Paraguay), the Danish *Folketing* (India), the Estonian *Riigikogu* (Taiwan), the Italian *Senato della Repubblica* (India), the Spanish *Cortes*

*Generales* (Canada, Chile, India, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates) and the European Parliament (Mexico, Brazil/Uruguay, Canada, Moldova, South Africa, Indonesia, USA, UK (Northern Ireland), and Thailand).

Although no Parliament/Chamber assigned this task to a specific Friendship Group, the Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, the Hungarian *Országgyűlés* and the Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, reported that the specific topic of trade agreements were discussed during bi- or multilateral visits.

**1.9** Eight Parliaments/Chambers have provided additional information on this chapter, which was subsequently integrated in the corresponding paragraphs above.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS IN HANDLING ENERGY POLICIES: RENEWABLE SOURCES OF ENERGY

THE SECOND CHAPTER OF THE 40<sup>TH</sup> BI-ANNUAL REPORT seeks to highlight how and when Parliaments/Chambers have dealt with specific measures and legislative proposals aimed at fostering the green transition specifically in the energy field. Special emphasis was given to the involvement of Parliaments/Chambers in the promotion of renewable sources of energy and the implementation of the EU's RePowerEU plan.

**2.1** When asked, with multiple choices allowed, if they had scrutinised any of a preselected set of legislative proposals in the field of energy policy, 26 Parliaments/Chambers out of the 30 who did reply to this question had done so for the “*Proposal on the revision of the Electricity Market Design*”, 25 on both the “*Proposal for a recast Directive on gas markets and hydrogen*” and on the “*Proposal for a recast Regulation on gas markets and hydrogen*”. Finally, 24 scrutinised the “*Proposal on the revision of EU's protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market rules*”.

**2.1.1** Those Parliaments who replied affirmatively were asked to precise how that scrutiny was performed. Twenty-six respondents informed they held “*debates at Committee level*”, whereas 14 did “*scrutinise the specific legislative proposals*”. Eight Parliaments/Chambers “*adopted a negotiating mandate for the Government*” (Danish *Folketing*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, Latvian *Saiema*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Slovak *Národná rada*, Slovenian *Državni zbor* and Swedish *Riksdag*), six “*adopted a resolution*” (Czech *Senát*, French *Assemblée nationale* and *Sénat*, German *Bundesrat*, Romanian *Senat* and Slovak *Národná rada*) and four held “*debates at Plenary level*” (Austrian *Nationalrat and Bundesrat*, Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Czech *Senát*, and Romanian *Senat*).

A few (five) Parliaments/Chambers identified other forms of scrutiny. The Croatian *Hrvatski sabor* replied that it had adopted conclusions on the national positions at Committee level. In the Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, two Members were appointed as EU-rapporteurs for the EU-electricity market reform, tasked with collecting information on the proposal. Moreover, this Chamber was also informed of the response of the Dutch Government to the consultation phase of the EU electricity market reform, which was followed by a written procedure during which Members could ask questions to the Government.


The Portuguese *Assembleia da República* informed that the Committee on the Environment and Energy and the European Affairs Committee had a joint meeting with the Commissioner for Energy, Ms Kadri SIMSON, who focused on several issues, such as the energy challenges resulting from the war in Ukraine, the transition to renewable sources of energy. Moreover, other topics such as consumer protection, the gas and hydrogen markets were also discussed. Furthermore, the Committee on the Environment and Energy and the Committee on European Affairs held a joint hearing with the Minister of Environment and Climate Action, after the Extraordinary TTE

(Energy) Council Meeting of 9th September 2022, to discuss the revision of the Electricity Market Design, emphasising the experience of the Iberian Electricity Market.

The Romanian *Parlamentul României: Camera Deputaţilor* informed it had adopted national legislation. In the case of the Spanish *Cortes Generales*, the Joint Committee for EU Affairs appointed a rapporteur for the scrutiny of both Proposals (Proposal for a recast Directive on gas markets and hydrogen and Proposal for a recast Regulation on gas markets and hydrogen) and the debate on the reports, which were rejected, took place on 4 May 2022.

**2.2** Parliaments/Chambers were also asked whether they had debated or approved an initiative related to a set of predefined European Union policies aimed at boosting renewable energy, with multiple choices allowed: “*Permits for new or adapted renewable energy power plants to be issued faster, including solar panels and windmills*”; “*Measures aimed at promoting the production of hydrogen by renewable electricity*”; “*Measures aimed at promoting offshore renewable energy sources, besides wind, such as tidal and wave power, floating solar energy and algae for biofuels*”; and on the “*EU solar energy strategy*”. Out of 28 respondents, the following chart illustrates the replies given to whether any of these initiatives were debated.

**Has your Parliament debated/approved any of the following EU policies for renewable energy? Votre Parlement a-t-il débattu/approuvé position sur une des politiques de l'UE à l'égard des énergies renouvelables?**



**2.2.1** The Parliaments/Chambers who replied affirmatively to the previous question were asked to precise how that scrutiny had taken place. Twenty mentioned “*debates at Committee level*” and 16 debates at the “*Plenary*”. Thirteen noted they had “*scrutinised specific legislative proposals*”, whereas eight “*adopted a resolution*” (German *Bundestag* and *Bundesrat*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor* and *Senat*, Slovak *Národná rada* and Spanish *Cortes Generales*) and four a “*negotiating mandate for the Government*” (Danish *Folketing*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Lithuanian *Seimas* and Slovak *Národná rada*).



Seven respondents precised other forms of scrutiny, such as the Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, who informed that national legislation was adopted aiming at facilitating introduction of solar panels, similar to the Austrian *Nationalrat and Bundesrat* and the Romanian *Camera Deputaților*, who also mentioned the adoption of national legislation.

The Dutch *Tweede Kamer* had appointed one Member as EU-rapporteur for the REpowerEU package, with the goal of gathering information on behalf of the House.

The Latvian *Saeima* mentioned an Energy Forum “Does Latvia need a sustainable energy strategy suited to its economic interests?” held in the Parliament in spring 2023. It was organised to debate measures aimed at promoting the production of hydrogen by renewable electricity and measures aimed at promoting offshore renewable energy sources.

The Portuguese *Assembleia da República* informed that the hearings held by the Committee on the Environment and Energy with the Minister of Environment and Climate Action, including the debate within the budgetary process, covered many of the above-mentioned topics.

The Slovenian *Državni zbor* noted that, following a proposal by the Government, it had adopted the Act on the Siting of Installations for Generating Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources in July 2023, aimed at speeding up and facilitating the introduction of renewable energy sources (RES) in the electricity sector in Slovenia.

**2.3** Eight Parliaments/Chambers provided additional information on this Chapter. The Belgian *Sénat/Senaat* noted that, regarding question 2.2, this subject was regularly discussed at meetings of the Federal advisory committee on European Affairs. On the same question, the Dutch *Eerste Kamer* noted that the Committee on Economic Affairs and Climate had scrutinised the permits for new or adapted renewable energy power plants to be issued faster. The Committee sent a political dialogue contribution to the European Commission and a letter to the Government regarding the proposal for a Council Regulation laying down a framework to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy. Furthermore, it highlighted that the Committee on Infrastructure, Water and the Environment had scrutinised measures aimed at promoting the production of hydrogen by renewable electricity with a similar outcome (political dialogue and a letter to the government regarding the Communication on a European Hydrogen Bank).

The European Affairs Committee and the Climate, Energy and Utilities Committee of the Danish *Folketing* had agreed to set up a working group to monitor and contribute to the development of the EU’s climate and energy policy. This working group consists of members from the two committees and Danish Members of the European Parliament.

The Italian *Senato della Repubblica* noted that, on the production of hydrogen, the Reform 3.2 of the Italian National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRPP) supported the production of electrolytic hydrogen from renewable energy sources and that a government decree had been approved on 30 April 2022. Furthermore, the Integrated National Energy and Climate Plan (June 2023) expected that cooperation on renewable energy solutions with neighbouring countries could be based on the sharing of projects for the development of offshore plants (offshore wind, tidal, wave power). It noted moreover that important incentives regarding solar energy, including on the use of solar panels, had been introduced with the “Energy” Decree.

The French *Sénat* informed that the proposal to revise the EU's protection against manipulation of the wholesale energy market was also the subject of a reasoned opinion concerning compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. The Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon* noted that issues such as renewable sources of energy were also on the agenda of the competent parliamentary Committees for discussion/consideration.

The Swedish *Riksdag* informed that, since the spring of 2021, the Committee on Industry and Trade had considered several proposals from the Government based on EU directives, concerning renewable energy to varying degrees. Other committees also dealt with proposals regarding speeding up the development of renewable energy sources. Finally, the EU policy to boost renewable energy sources could, in various ways, be the subject of debate in the Chamber through interpellation debates or questions to governmental ministers.

The European Parliament pointed out other elements highlighted by its Committees, namely the public hearings on "Energy efficiency on farms" (Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development), on the social dimension related to energy policies (energy poverty, just transition), and the call for an EU sovereignty fund (Committee on Employment and Social Affairs).

## CHAPTER 3

### THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTS WHEN CONFRONTED WITH RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE

THE THIRD CHAPTER OF THE 40<sup>TH</sup> BI-ANNUAL REPORT seeks to highlight the role and activities of Parliaments/Chambers in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The questions address different angles of this response, ranging from scrutinising Council conclusions, the position regarding EU sanctions on Russia, Ukraine's accession to the European Union, or the discussion of the future reconstruction of Ukraine.

**3.1** When asked about the format in which debates on Ukraine usually took place, by choosing from a set of predefined alternatives with multiple choice allowed, Parliaments/Chambers replied in the way illustrated in the table below. It is worth noting that Ukraine has been discussed by all Parliaments/Chambers.

FORMAT OF THE DEBATES ON UKRAINE	REPLY
<i>Plenary sessions</i>	32
<i>Foreign Affairs Committee</i>	35
<i>European Affairs Committee</i>	31
<i>Ad hoc bilateral relations</i>	22
<i>Ad hoc multilateral meetings</i>	15
<i>Other</i>	7
<i>Total respondents</i>	37

The Foreign Affairs Committee (35 out of 37 respondents) and the European Affairs Committee (31 out of 37 respondents) were the parliamentary committees that the largest number of Parliament/Chambers indicated as the format for discussions on Ukraine. In addition, the Slovenian *Državni svet* indicated that Ukraine was dealt with by the Committee for International Relations and European Affairs (which could be seen as an additional reply to both Committees). Only the Belgian *Sénat/Senaat* did not indicate that the Foreign Affairs Committee dealt with the subject of Ukraine. The Belgian *Chambre des représentants/Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers* for its part noted that Ukraine was a regular topic of debate in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, particularly

through oral questions to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Four Parliaments/Chambers did not indicate that the European Affairs Committee was dealing with the subject of Ukraine: Belgian *Chambre des représentants/Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers*, Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer*, and the Italian *Camera dei Deputati*. The European Parliament dealt with the matter in different parliamentary Committees.

Seven Parliaments/Chambers used the option “Other” in the questionnaire to provide additional information. Four Parliaments/Chambers - the Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Slovak *Národná rada*, and Swedish *Riksdag* - indicated that the Defence Committee had been a format for debates on Ukraine. The Dutch *Tweede Kamer* also listed the Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation Committee as having dealt with the matter. The European Parliament indicated that the Budget Committee had discussed the subject of Ukraine.


A very large majority of the Parliaments/Chambers (32 out of 37 respondents) have held debates on Ukraine in a Plenary session format. Only five Parliaments/Chambers (the Belgian *Chambre des représentants/Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers*, the Danish *Folketing*, the Finnish *Eduskunta*, the Slovenian *Državni svet* and the Spanish *Cortes Generales*) did not indicate that this format had been used.

Other formats used by Parliaments/Chambers to debate Ukraine include *ad hoc* bilateral relations (22 out of 37 respondents) and *ad hoc* multilateral meetings (15 out of 37 respondents). The Polish *Sejm* noted that the Foreign Affairs Committee held bilateral meetings with Ukrainian representatives as well as participated in multilateral meetings in the Bucharest Nine (B9) or Visegrad Four (V4) formats.

The Italian *Camera dei Deputati* and *Senato della Repubblica*, and the European Parliament highlighted the organisation of public hearings and debates with the participation of civil society on the subject of Ukraine. The European Parliament also noted that parliamentary Committees had carried out *ad hoc* visits to Ukraine, and that joint Committee meetings between the European Parliament and the corresponding Ukrainian *Verkhovna Rada*’s parliamentary committees had taken place as formats for discussion of Ukraine. Conversely, the Portuguese *Assembleia da República* noted that the Parliamentary Friendship Group Portugal-Russia was not set up in the current legislature.

**3.2** When asked whether they had scrutinised Council conclusions in relation to Ukraine, a majority of the Parliaments/Chambers (27 out of 37 respondents) indicated “yes”, while 10 out of 37 indicated “no”. The Belgian *Chambre des représentants/Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, French *Assemblée Nationale*, German *Bundesrat*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Polish *Sejm*, Polish *Senat*, Romanian *Senat* and Slovenian *Državni svet* all indicated they had not scrutinised Council conclusions in relation to Ukraine.

**Does your Parliament/Chamber scrutinise Council conclusions in relation to Ukraine? Votre Parlement/Chambre examine-t-il les conclusions du Conseil concernant l'Ukraine?**



**3.2.1** As a follow-up, Parliaments/Chambers which replied affirmatively were asked to specify how this scrutiny had been carried out, by choosing from a set of predefined alternatives, with multiple choices allowed. The replies of the 27 Parliaments/Chambers which had scrutinised Council conclusions in relation to Ukraine were distributed as follows:

WAY OF SCRUTINISING COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS	REPLY
<i>Debate in the Parliament/ Chamber</i>	<b>11</b>
<i>Debate at Committee level</i>	<b>23</b>
<i>By adopting a resolution</i>	<b>4</b>
<i>By adopting a negotiating mandate for the Government</i>	<b>8</b>
<i>By scrutinising specific legislative proposals</i>	<b>1</b>
<i>Other</i>	<b>3</b>
<i>Total respondents</i>	<b>27</b>

The European Parliament was the only respondent that indicated the “*scrutiny of specific legislative proposals*” as a form of scrutiny, and referred to the financial support to Ukraine provided through the EU budget, as well as the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on establishing the Ukraine Facility.

Four Parliaments/Chambers (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati* and *Senato della Repubblica* and Slovak *Národná rada*) indicated the “*adoption of a resolution*” as a form of scrutiny.

Eight Parliaments/Chambers (Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Latvian *Saeima*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Slovak *Národná rada*, Swedish *Riksdag*) replied that the scrutiny of Council conclusions on Ukraine was done by “*adopting a negotiating mandate for the Government*”. The Italian *Senato della Repubblica* specifically referred to their resolution of 28 June 2023, which committed the Government, in view of the European Council of 29-30 June 2023, to support Ukraine from a financial, economic, humanitarian, military and diplomatic point of view; to recognize Ukraine's commitment to the EU accession process; to guarantee the broadest support for initiatives aimed at prosecuting crimes committed on Ukrainian territory; to counter Russia's forced deportation of Ukrainian children; and to encourage every initiative aimed at a just peace.

Two other ways for scrutinising Council conclusions in relation to Ukraine highlighted in the replies to the questionnaire were “*Debate at Committee level*”, indicated by 23 respondents, and “*Debate in the Parliament/ Chamber*”, noted by 11 Parliaments/Chambers.

Out of the 11 Parliaments/Chambers that debated Council conclusions, four did this only in the Plenary (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati* and Spanish *Cortes Generales*). The other seven Parliaments/Chambers debated the subject at both Plenary and Committee level: Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, Czech *Senát*, French *Sénat*, German *Bundestag*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica* and European Parliament.

The Belgian *Sénat/Senaat* noted that the different aspects related to the war in Ukraine were regularly discussed in the Federal Advisory Committee on European Affairs. The Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna* also noted that the Committee on European Affairs regularly scrutinised the position of the Government before meetings of the European Council, which had recently included discussions on the situation in Ukraine. The Lithuanian *Seimas* indicated that the Committees on Foreign and European Affairs regularly discussed and endorsed, under their respective remit, the negotiating mandate for the Government to present at the meetings of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, the General Affairs Council and the European Council. In their meetings, the relevant *Seimas* Committees cover various aspects of Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the future of Ukraine.


The Italian *Camera dei Deputati* and *Senato della Repubblica* further specified, under “*other*”, that the activities of the European Council and the EU Council in relation to Ukraine were scrutinised at Plenary level, in the debates with the Prime Minister ahead of every summit. These debates were usually followed by the adoption of resolutions to the Government. Both Chambers of the Italian Parliament also held a regular joint hearing of the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister by the Foreign Affairs Committees, following each EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting.

The Swedish *Riksdag* noted, under “other” that the Government forwarded any Council conclusions within the respective Committees’ areas of responsibility, and that in the case of Ukraine such conclusions have been forwarded to the Committee on Defence, but no formal examination has taken place. The Austrian *Nationalrat and Bundesrat* precised that their answers related to Draft Conclusions of the European Council.

**3.3** Asked whether they had adopted a position on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, a slight majority of Parliaments/Chambers (22 out of 37 respondents) replied “yes”, while 13 out of 37 indicated “no”. The Belgian *Chambre des représentants/Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers* and *Sénat/Senaat*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Danish *Folketing*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, French *Assemblée nationale* and *Sénat*, German *Bundestag*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Slovenian *Državni zbor* and Slovenian *Državni svet* all replied that they had not adopted a position on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.

Two Parliaments/Chambers (Austrian *Nationalrat and Bundesrat* and Dutch *Eerste Kamer*) indicated that this question was “not applicable”. The Dutch *Eerste Kamer* further noted that its main focus was on legislation, it was uncommon to adopt positions of this kind. The Austrian *Nationalrat and Bundesrat* noted that no position was adopted on this matter but that the subject was frequently debated in the Chamber and at Committee level.

Has your Parliament/Chamber adopted a position on Ukraine’s accession to the EU? Votre Parlement/Assemblée a-t-il adopté une position sur l’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’UE?



**3.3.1** As a follow-up question, Parliaments/Chambers which replied affirmatively were asked to specify how this position on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union had been adopted, by choosing from a set of predefined alternatives, with multiple choices allowed. The replies provided were distributed as follows:



HOW THE POSITION ON UKRAINE'S ACCESSION TO THE EU WAS ADOPTED	REPLY
<i>Debate in the Parliament/ Chamber</i>	<b>14</b>
<i>Debate at Committee level</i>	<b>20</b>
<i>By adopting a resolution</i>	<b>16</b>
<i>By adopting a negotiating mandate for the Government</i>	<b>5</b>
<i>By scrutinising specific legislative proposals</i>	<b>3</b>
<i>Other</i>	<b>2</b>
<i>Total respondents</i>	<b>23</b>

The Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor* noted under “other” that the position had been taken by adopting a political declaration.

Three Parliaments/Chambers, the Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Romanian *Senat* and European Parliament, indicated the scrutiny of specific legislative proposals as one of the forms used for adopting a position on Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.

Five Parliaments/Chambers answered that the position was taken by “adopting a negotiating mandate” for the Government: Finnish *Eduskunta*, Latvian *Saeima*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Slovak *Národná rada* and Swedish *Riksdag*.

Sixteen Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they had “adopted a resolution” on their position on the accession of Ukraine to the European Union. Of these, nine Parliaments/Chambers combined the “adoption of a resolution” with “debates both at Committee level and in the Parliament/Chamber”: Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Czech *Senát*, German *Bundesrat*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati* and *Senato della Repubblica*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Polish *Seniat*, Romanian *Senat* and European Parliament. Six other Parliaments/Chambers combined the adoption of a resolution with “debates at Committee level” only: Latvian *Saeima*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Polish *Sejm*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Slovak *Národná rada* and Spanish *Cortes Generales*. The Estonian *Riigikogu*, combined the “adoption of a resolution” only with a “debate at the Plenary”.



A total of 14 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they had held a debate in the Plenary for the adoption of their position on Ukraine's accession to the European Union, while 20 Parliaments/Chambers held a debate at Committee level.

**3.4** When asked if the Parliament/Chamber adopted a position on the sanctions approved by the Council of the European Union on Russia, the majority replied that they had done so (27 out of 37 replies). Six respondents did not adopt a position (Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, German *Bundestag*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Romanian *Parlamentul României: Camera Deputaţilor* and Slovenian *Državni svet*) and four respondents chose the option 'no answer' (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer*, Polish *Sejm* and Romanian *Senat*).

**3.4.1** In the follow-up question when the Parliaments/Chambers answered affirmatively, they could indicate with multiple choices through which means they adopted this position. The replies were distributed as follows:

SANCTIONS - HOW WAS THE POSITION ADOPTED	REPLY
<i>Debate in the Parliament/ Chamber</i>	16
<i>Debate at Committee level</i>	23
<i>By adopting a resolution</i>	21
<i>By adopting a negotiating mandate for the Government</i>	7
<i>By scrutinising specific legislative proposals</i>	1
<i>Other</i>	1
<i>Total respondents</i>	27

Twenty-three Parliaments/Chambers organised a “*debate at Committee level*”, whilst 16 respondents indicated that they organised a “*debate in the Plenary*”. The Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Belgian *Sénat/Senaat*, Czech *Senát*, *Staten-Generaal: Tweede Kamer*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, French *Assemblée nationale*, French *Sénat*, German *Bundesrat*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Polish *Senat*, Swedish *Riksdag* and the European Parliament were the 14 Parliaments/Chambers that indicated the they organised debates both in the Parliament/Chamber and at Committee level.

Twenty-one Parliaments/Chambers adopted a resolution and seven “*adopted a negotiating mandate for the Government*” (Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Danish *Folketinget*, Finish *Eduskunta*,

Latvian *Saeima*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Slovak *Národná rada* and Swedish *Riksdag*). Both actions were indicated by the Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Latvian *Saeima*, Lithuanian *Seimas* and the Slovak *Národná rada*. Multiple resolutions were adopted by the Belgian *Sénat/Senaat*<sup>9</sup>.


The Lithuanian *Seimas* clarified that, alongside endorsing the positions ahead of the European Council meeting, and in order to prevent any opt-outs from EU sanctions against individuals and undertakings engaged in global trade, the Committees proposed to the President and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania “to form a coalition of EU Member States opposing exemptions from EU sanctions against the criminal regimes of Russia and Belarus”.

A position on the sanctions by means of adopting a resolution was indicated by the Belgian *Chambre des représentants/Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers*<sup>10</sup> without indicating any other options.

The Polish *Senat* replied that besides the “debates in the Chamber”, at the “Committee level” and the “adoption of a negotiating mandate”, they also “scrutinised specific legislative proposals”. It was the only respondent to indicate all the options. The Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, under the option ‘Other’, answered that they adopted a position on the sanctions

**3.5** On the question of whether the Parliaments/Chambers have debated the future reconstruction of Ukraine, more than three quarters answered affirmatively (30 out of 37 replies). Seven respondents indicated that they did not debate the future reconstruction (Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Danish *Folketing*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Polish *Senat* and Slovenian *Državni svet*).

Has your Parliament/Chamber debated the future reconstruction of Ukraine?  
Votre Parlement/Assemblée a-t-il débattu de la future reconstruction de l'Ukraine ?



<sup>9</sup> The example given is the resolution 7-361/2 on combating impunity for war crimes in Ukraine, in which it calls on the government to impose sanctions on Russia and Belarus respectively, and to ensure that the various packages of sanctions already imposed are implemented.

<sup>10</sup> Resolution DOC 55 3141/007 on the inclusion of the ban on the import of Russian diamonds in the list of European sanctions against the Russian Federation and resolution DOC 55 3209/008 on developing a European legal framework concerning States supporting terrorism.

**3.5.1** Out of the 30 Parliaments/Chambers that indicated that they did debate the future reconstruction of Ukraine, 26 organised a debate at Committee level, whilst only 15 organised a debate in the Parliament/Chamber.

RECONSTRUCTION OF UKRAINE - HOW WAS THE DEBATE ORGANISED	REPLY
<i>Debate in the Parliament/ Chamber</i>	<b>15</b>
<i>Debate at Committee level</i>	<b>26</b>
<i>By adopting a resolution</i>	<b>12</b>
<i>By adopting a negotiating mandate for the Government</i>	<b>5</b>
<i>By scrutinising specific legislative proposals</i>	<b>3</b>
<i>Other</i>	<b>1</b>
<i>Total respondents</i>	<b>30</b>

Twelve respondents “*adopted a resolution*” and five adopted a “*negotiating mandate for the Government*” (Finnish *Eduskunta*, Latvian *Saeima*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Slovak *Národná rada* and Swedish *Riksdag*). The Romanian *Senat*, Swedish *Riksdag* and the European Parliament “*scrutinised specific legislative proposals*”.

Besides the debate organised at Committee level, the Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat* indicated that they also held bilateral and multilateral meetings on the matter.

The combination of a “*debate in Plenary*”, a “*debate at Committee level*” and the “*adoption of a resolution*” was indicated by nine respondents (Belgian *Sénat/Senaat*, French *Assemblée nationale* and *Sénat*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Polish *Senat* and Spanish *Cortes Generales*).

**3.6** Eleven Parliaments/Chambers provided additional information on this chapter. In some cases, this information has been included in the section dealing with the corresponding question (above). A summary of other relevant information is provided below.

The Belgian *Chambre des représentants/Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers* indicated that various resolutions have been adopted, as mentioned in question 3.4. On the issue of the annexation of

Ukrainian territories by Russia, the Chamber adopted a resolution to reject the incorporation of the occupied Ukrainian territories into the Russian Federation<sup>11</sup>.

The debates in the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* happened in light of the yearly debate on Europe. Regarding questions 3.3 and 3.4, this Parliament/Chamber clarified that as its main focus was on legislation, it was uncommon to adopt positions of this kind.

The Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon* added that at parliamentary level, it had been explicitly declared that it stood in solidarity with Ukraine and, together with its partners and allies, was committed to a continuous political, economic, financial, military and humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainian leadership and people in their fight to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity and freedom. Furthermore, they are looking at Ukraine's post-war future with a process of firmly anchoring the country to the EU, with a status of candidate for accession, as well as by setting up the necessary instruments to contribute strongly to the country's reconstruction.

The Lithuanian *Seimas*, further to the reply to question 3.4, referred to a resolution adopted on the invitation to Ukraine to join NATO on 19 september 2023.

The European Parliament indicated that it had debated various aspects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, such as the consequences on agriculture and food security, the economic impact of the financial sector sanctions on Russia or the situation of children, women affected by the war.

## **COMPARATIVE DATA**

The following section provides a comparative overview of the replies provided by the Parliaments/Chambers to the questions:

- “How were the Council conclusions relating to Ukraine scrutinised?” (Q3.2.1 - 27 replies);
- “How has a position been adopted on Ukraine's accession to the EU?” (Q3.3.1 - 22 replies);
- “How was a position on the sanctions adopted?” (Q3.4.1 - 26 replies);
- “How has the debate on future reconstruction of Ukraine taken place?” (Q3.5.1 - 29 replies).

The questionnaire provided a choice among the same options for these four different questions. The comparative data is compiled in the following tables, and seeks to provide an overview of: the number of Parliaments/Chambers that held debates at Committee level, Plenary level, or both; the different actions adopted (resolution/mandate/scrutiny of legislative proposals or a combination of them); and the existing combinations indicated between debates held and actions taken.

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<sup>11</sup> Resolution DOC 55 2938/005

**COMPARATIVE DATA - DEBATE**

	How were the Council conclusions relating to Ukraine scrutinised ? (Q3.2.1 - 27 replies)	How has a position been adopted on Ukraine's accession to the EU? (Q3.3.1 - 22 replies)	How was a position on the sanctions adopted? (Q3.4.1 - 26 replies)	How has the debate on future reconstruction of Ukraine taken place? (Q3.5.1 - 29 replies)
<i>Debate in the Parliament/Chamber</i>	4	2	2	3
<i>Debate at Committee level</i>	16	8	9	14
<i>Debate in the Parliament/Chamber and at Committee level</i>	7	12	14	12
<i>No debate took place</i>	0	0	2	1

When asked if they organised a debate in light of the specific topics, the majority of Parliaments/Chambers replied that they both held a debate in the Plenary, as well as at the Committee level. Only for question 3.2.1 on the scrutiny of Council conclusions relating to Ukraine the majority of the answers referred to a debate only at Committee level.

Within the Parliaments/Chambers who indicated that they did do something in light of a parliamentary position on the adopted sanctions (Q3.4.1) and a debate on the future reconstruction of Ukraine (Q3.5.1), respectively two and one Parliament/Chamber indicated that they did not organise a debate.

**COMPARATIVE DATA - ACTIONS**

The Parliaments/Chambers were asked to indicate if they did one of the following actions in light of the different topics: adopt a resolution, adopt a mandate for the government in light of the coming Council meeting or scrutinise legislation.

None of the Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they did all three actions. The combination of actions that was most often indicated, was the combination of adopting a resolution and a mandate with respectively two, three, four and one respondent.

The most frequent situation was that the Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they did only one of the actions specified, respectively 9, 14, 19 and 12 as illustrated below.

	How were the Council conclusions relating to Ukraine scrutinised? (Q3.2.1 - 27 replies)	How has a position been adopted on Ukraine's accession to the EU? (Q3.3.1 - 22 replies)	How was a position on the sanctions adopted? (Q3.4.1 - 26 replies)	How has the debate on future reconstruction of Ukraine taken place? (Q3.5.1 - 29 replies)
<i>Adopted a resolution and a mandate</i>	2	3	4	1
<i>Adopted a resolution and scrutinised legislation</i>	0	2	1	2
<i>Adopted a mandate and scrutinised legislation</i>	0	0	0	1
<i>Did all three actions</i>	0	0	0	0
<i>Did one of the three actions</i>	9	14	19	12

### **COMPARATIVE DATA - DEBATES AND ACTIONS**

In this section the data is compared to who only took action in one field, debate or action, and who took action in both. It is to be noted that only one Parliament/Chamber indicated that they only executed an action for the question on a position on the adopted sanctions (Q3.4.1).

When the Parliaments/Chambers were asked about the scrutiny on Council conclusions (Q3.2.1) and the debate on the future reconstruction of Ukraine (Q3.5.1), around half of the respondents only debated the matter, whilst the other half both debated the matter and took some sort of further action. Within the questions on the adoption of a position on Ukraine's accession to the EU (Q3.3.1) and a position on the sanctions (Q3.4.1), the majority indicated that they both had a debate and followed up by taking some sort of further initiatives, as illustrated below.

	How were the Council conclusions relating to Ukraine scrutinised ? (Q3.2.1 - 27 replies)	How has a position been adopted on Ukraine's accession to the EU? (Q3.3.1 - 22 replies)	How was a position on the sanctions adopted? (Q3.4.1 - 26 replies)	How has the debate on future reconstruction of Ukraine taken place? (Q3.5.1 - 29 replies)
<i>Only debated on the matter</i>	16	3	2	13
<i>Only executed actions</i>	0	0	1	0
<i>Both debated and executed actions</i>	11	19	23	16





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