

45th

BI-ANNUAL REPORT OF COSAC

**Developments in European Union Procedures
and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny**



COSAC Chairpersons' meeting in Nicosia 11-12 January 2026. Photo: Vouli ton Antiprosopon



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BACKGROUND

This is the Forty-Fifth Bi-annual Report from the COSAC Secretariat.

COSAC Bi-annual Reports

The XXX COSAC decided that the COSAC Secretariat should produce factual Bi-annual Reports, to be published ahead of each ordinary meeting of the Conference. The purpose of the Reports is to give an overview of the developments in procedures and practices in the European Union that are relevant to parliamentary scrutiny.

All the Bi-annual Reports are available on the IPEX website, either by accessing this [overview](#) or by navigating to the respective [meeting](#).

The four chapters of this Bi-annual Report are based on information provided by the national Parliaments of the European Union Member States and the European Parliament. The deadline for submitting replies to the questionnaire for the 45th Bi-annual Report was 9 February 2026.

The outline of this Report was adopted by the meeting of the Chairpersons of COSAC, held 11-12 January, in Nicosia.

As a general rule, the Report does not refer to all Parliaments or Chambers that have responded to a given question. Instead, illustrative examples are used.

Please note that, in some cases, respondents are able to provide more than one answer to multiple choice questions. This may explain any perceived disparity in the total number of answers to a question and the total number of respondents can thus be accounted for.

Complete replies, received from 38 national Parliaments/Chambers of 27 Member States and of the European Parliament, can be found in the annex on the [COSAC section](#) on the IPEX website. One Chamber did not submit replies within deadline.

Note on Numbers

Of the 27 Member States of the European Union, 15 have a unicameral Parliament and 12 have a bicameral Parliament. Due to this combination of unicameral and bicameral systems, there are 39 national parliamentary Chambers in the 27 Member States of the European Union.

Although they have bicameral systems, the national Parliaments of Austria, Ireland and Spain each submit a single set of replies to the questionnaire, therefore the maximum number of respondents per question is 37, including the European Parliament. There were 36 responses to the questionnaire.

ABSTRACT

Chapter 1: Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034

The first chapter of the report is about parliamentary engagement with the proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-2034. In the first question of the chapter, Parliaments/Chambers were asked to select up to three areas they considered to be of highest priority for the next MFF to address. The most selected choices were Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (selected by 21 Parliaments/Chambers), Cohesion policy (selected by 20 Parliaments/Chambers), and Defence and strategic autonomy (selected by 19 Parliaments/Chambers), with Migration and border management, EU enlargement support, Climate adaptation and environment and Digital transformation less frequently indicated as priority areas. In addition, 15 Parliaments/Chambers chose the option “Other” and provided additional details.

In the second question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they had discussed the flexibility of the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to respond to crises. Just over half (19 out of 36) responded that discussion had taken place on the subject. Those Parliaments/Chambers in which there had been such a discussion were also invited to share their opinion on this matter, which 18 did. Twelve indicated that they were in favour of flexibility mechanisms, while four expressed some reservation towards aspects of increased flexibility. Parliaments/Chambers were also asked whether they thought flexibility mechanisms should be limited to specific areas, or if they should be applied across the entire budget. Ten thought they should be applied across the whole budget, and six believed such mechanisms should be limited to specific areas.

In the last question of the chapter, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they would consider supporting the introduction of a mid-term mandatory review of the MFF by the European Commission; while 20 replied that they had no opinion on the matter, 12 replied that they were in favour of such a review. No Parliament/Chamber replied that they were against it. Parliaments/Chambers were also given the opportunity to provide further information to the chapter in the last question.

Chapter 2: Parliamentary Engagement in EU Foreign Affairs: Enlargement Policy

The second chapter concerns parliamentary engagement in foreign affairs, notably enlargement. The first question was whether Parliaments/Chambers had examined the European Commission [2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy \(COM\(2025\) 690\)](#). Sixteen Parliaments/Chambers had done so, and 20 replied that they had not done so. The ones who had done so were then asked on what level the communication had been examined. Twelve indicated that the examination had been done at committee level. None of the responding Parliaments/Chambers selected the option “Plenary”. Several respondents also provided more information on the modalities of examination by choosing “Other” and explaining the situation

in their own words. Parliaments/Chambers that had examined the communication were also asked if they had consulted their government before or during the process. Thirteen replied that they had done so, and only two indicated that they had not consulted their government. Similarly, they were asked if they had adopted a political opinion in the framework of the political dialogue as a result of the examination; only two had done so.

In the next question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked to identify reforms they believed were necessary for the EU to better integrate new members. Respondents could select one or more of three pre-defined options and could also briefly specify additional reforms under “Other”; “Adjustments to the EU budget” was the most frequently selected, with 21 Parliaments/Chambers choosing this option. “Streamlined decision-making procedures” was selected by 17 Parliaments/Chambers, while “Reform of European Parliament seat allocation” was selected by seven Parliaments/Chambers. Replies provided under the option “Other” reflected a broad range of additional perspectives on reforms considered necessary by Parliaments/Chambers to facilitate the integration of new members and was chosen by 20 Parliaments/Chambers.

The next question concerned what tools Parliaments/Chambers use to oversee the enlargement process. Again, Parliaments/Chambers could choose one or several of four pre-defined options or specify additional tools under the heading “Other” (which was chosen by 13 respondents), “Scrutiny of government action in the Council” was the most frequently selected tool, chosen by 30 Parliaments/Chambers. This was followed by “Regular dialogues with candidate country parliaments”, selected by 16 Parliaments/Chambers, “Thematic hearings and debates”, selected by 15 Parliaments/Chambers, and “Pre-accession monitoring reports”, selected by 14 Parliaments/Chambers.

In the final question of the chapter, Parliaments/Chambers were also invited to provide additional information as they saw fit. Eight did so.

Chapter 3: Scrutiny of EU Legislative Proposals by National Parliaments

The third chapter focuses on two topics connected with parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs: subsidiarity assessments and analytical capacity; and contacts with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). In the first question of the chapter, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they scrutinise the annual Commission Work Programme (CWP). Only four replied that they don’t scrutinise it. Parliaments/Chambers were then asked how the topics or legislative files listed in the CWP were allocated within their Parliament/Chamber for scrutiny. The most chosen response (among six multiple-choice options) was that the Committee on European Affairs examined the entire CWP; 18 Parliaments/Chambers chose this option. 17 Parliaments/Chambers also provided more detailed explanations about the procedure by choosing the option “Other” and providing longer, written replies.

The next question concerned whether Parliaments/Chambers rely on in-house experts to analyse legislative proposals. Again, they had the possibility to choose one or several of five

pre-defined replies, and/or to specify another reply with their own words. 16 Parliaments/Chambers replied that there was a dedicated internal team of experts for this purpose, and 13 replied that analysis is carried out by committee secretariats or legal services. Lower numbers indicated that analysis is provided by the government, that external experts are consulted when needed, or that such analysis is not systematically carried out. In addition, 16 respondents took the opportunity to provide additional information by choosing the option “Other”. In the next question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked how they ensure adequate analysis and support for scrutiny when confronted with EU legislative proposals of high complexity or strategic importance. They could again choose from one or several of four pre-defined alternatives. Almost all (29) indicated that they do so by requesting explanatory material from their government of Permanent Representation, and a large number (21) indicated that they consult external experts such as academics or stakeholders. A smaller number of respondents indicated that they do so by assigning the file to specialised staff or advisors, or that no special approach is followed. Eleven respondents furthermore chose “Other” and provided information in writing on how they address particularly complex files.

They were also asked which sources of information or analytical tools they consult when conducting subsidiarity assessments. Like before, they could choose from one or several of six pre-defined alternatives. The most frequently chosen option was “Input from the government”, which 31 respondents had indicated. 30 respondents furthermore indicated that they used reasoned opinions and comments from other national Parliaments via IPEX. Other replies were chosen by a smaller number of respondents. Parliaments/Chambers were then asked if they continue to follow the progress of a proposal in the EU legislative process after submitting a reasoned opinion or political dialogue contribution on a legislative proposal. Seventeen replied that they do so in all cases, and 13 replied that they do so in selected/high-priority cases. Five replied that they do not do so. The Parliaments/Chambers who had replied yes to the previous question were then asked what kind of follow-up they carry out on a legislative proposal after submitting an opinion and receiving a reply from the Commission. The most chosen reply, again among a set of seven multiple-choice options, was that the Parliament/Chamber continued tracking the file via IPEX; 22 respondents indicated this. Almost as many (21) indicated that they requested updates from the national government.

The next question concerned whether Parliaments/Chambers exchange information with MEPs from their country regarding EU legislative proposals examined at the national level. A majority of 28 Parliaments/Chambers replied that such exchanges take place, with only seven replying “no” to this question. Those who replied “yes” were also asked whether this process was provided for under the constitution of their country or under the rules of procedure of their Parliament/Chamber. None of those who replied stated that the process was provided for under their constitution. Sixteen Parliaments/Chambers replied that their rules of procedures (or the equivalent) contained guidance on how exchanges of information with MEPs could or should take place. In a second follow-up question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked in which ways this exchange of information usually takes place. Respondents could choose one or several of five pre-defined alternatives or briefly specify another option by choosing “Other”. Twenty Parliaments/Chambers replied that an exchange takes place through informal contacts, and 18

indicated that MEPs attend national committee meetings. A further 17 Parliaments/chambers indicated that exchanges take place through the national Parliament's representation in Brussels. Other options were chosen by a smaller number of respondents. Parliaments/Chambers were also asked if MEPs from their country inform the Parliament/Chamber on the outcome of discussions in the European Parliament on EU proposals previously scrutinised at national level. Twenty-five Parliaments/Chambers replied "no", and nine replied "yes".

In the next question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they had taken any initiatives to strengthen cooperation or information-sharing with MEPs. While 11 Parliaments/Chambers replied "no", five replied "no, but such initiatives are being considered." A majority of Parliaments/Chambers (19) however replied that such initiatives had been taken and provided a brief overview of their actions in this regard. The last question of this chapter was again an invitation to Parliaments/Chambers to provide any additional information.

Chapter 4: Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools in Parliaments

The fourth and last chapter contains questions about the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in Parliaments/Chambers. In the first question of this chapter, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they had developed or adopted any AI tools to support its work. Seventeen answered that tools had been externally developed or that commercially available tools were used, and 12 answered that one or more tools had been developed in-house specifically for parliamentary use. Those Parliaments/Chambers who had indicated that they use AI tools were furthermore asked about the purpose of these tools. The most chosen response was that the purpose of the AI tools was drafting and/or summarising documents, indicated by 18 respondents. Sixteen indicated that the purpose of AI tools were research and/or information retrieval, and 14 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that the purpose of AI tools were supporting translation or multilingual access. Smaller number of respondents chose other options, and besides the above indications 19 Parliaments/Chambers also further specified the purpose of the AI tools in use by providing additional information under the heading "Other".

Furthermore, Parliaments/Chambers were asked about the main challenges or risks Parliaments/Chambers face in adopting AI-based tools. They could choose from eight pre-defined replies or reply "Other". A majority of 26 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that accuracy and/or reliability issues were one of the main risks or challenges, 22 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that data protection and legal and/or ethical concerns were one of the main risks or challenges, 16 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that budgetary constraints were one of the main risks or challenges and 11 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that lack of tailored tools for parliamentary needs were one of the main risks or challenges. Smaller number of respondents chose other options. Conversely, Parliaments/Chambers were also asked which benefits had been observed from the use of AI tools and could again choose from six pre-defined alternatives or indicate "Other". Twenty-five Parliaments/Chambers answered that a facilitated work process was a main benefit which had been observed from the

use of AI tools, and 24 Parliaments/Chambers answered time savings in drafting/research. Smaller numbers chose other options.

In the next question Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they had provided training to Members of Parliament and/or staff on the use or implications of AI. Eighteen Parliaments/Chambers answered that training had been provided to parliamentary staff and seven Parliaments/Chambers answered that training had been provided to parliamentary staff and Members of Parliament. Furthermore, five Parliaments/Chambers answered that training was being planned.

Parliaments/Chambers were also asked if they had a dedicated team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI. Fifteen Parliaments/Chambers answered that responsibilities for AI were assigned to an existing department, 10 Parliaments/Chambers answered that a dedicated AI team existed, and three Parliaments/Chambers answered that a dedicated team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI was under consideration. Eight Parliaments/Chambers answered that they had no dedicated team, unit or designated staff responsible. Parliaments/Chambers who had replied that they had a such a team, unit or designated staff responsible were asked what their main role was and could choose from five pre-selected alternatives or “Other”. Twenty-two Parliaments/Chambers answered that the main role of the team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI was developing or coordinating the use of AI tools in parliamentary work, 20 Parliaments/Chambers answered that the main role of the team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI was monitoring developments in AI and emerging technologies and the same number answered that drafting internal guidelines or strategies on AI was their main role. Providing training and guidance to parliamentary staff was furthermore indicated in 18 cases, and 12 Parliaments/Chambers answered that the main role of the team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI was advising Members of Parliament and/or committees on AI-related issues. Seven Parliaments/Chambers also specified the role of a team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI. Lastly, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they had any further information to share on the topic of the use of AI tools. Ten Parliaments/Chambers contributed with further information.

CHAPTER ONE

MULTIANNUAL FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK 2028-2034

THE FIRST CHAPTER OF THE 45th BI-ANNUAL REPORT is about the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-2034. The European Commission presented its [proposal for the MFF 2028-2034](#) in 2025. It sets out the Union's long-term budgetary priorities and expenditure ceilings. The proposal aims to align the EU's financial planning with evolving political, economic and social challenges, including the green and digital transitions, enlargement, competitiveness, and security needs.

This chapter seems to gather information on the scrutiny activities carried out by national Parliaments in relation to the MFF package, as well as their positions regarding its main priorities, flexibility mechanisms and potential reforms to ensure that the EU budget remains transparent, sustainable and responsive to future developments.

1. In the first question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked to select up to three policy areas they considered the highest priorities for the next MFF, with multiple answers possible. All Parliaments/Chambers replied to this question.


The three more selected choices were Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (selected by 21 Parliaments/Chambers), Cohesion policy (selected by 20 Parliaments/Chambers), and Defence and strategic autonomy (selected by 19 Parliaments/Chambers).

The other policy areas were selected by a smaller number of Parliaments/Chambers. Eight Parliaments/Chambers specified Migration and border management (Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Lithuanian *Seimas* and Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*) and also eight specified EU enlargement support (Austrian *Nationalrat and Bundesrat*, Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants*, Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Slovak *Národná rada*, and the European Parliament).

Four Parliaments/Chambers selected Climate adaptation and environment (Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, German *Bundesrat*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon* and Lithuanian *Seimas*) and Reform of EU own resources (Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, French *Assemblée nationale*, French *Sénat* and German *Bundesrat*). Only one indicated Digital transformation (German *Bundesrat*).

Five Parliaments/Chambers indicated they had no opinion on the matter (Belgian *Senaat/Sénat*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer*, Spanish *Cortes Generales* and Swedish

Riksdag). Two other Parliaments/Chambers used the option “Other” to indicate that they have not adopted an opinion/position on priorities within the MFF (Danish *Folketing* and German *Bundestag*).



Lastly, a total of 15 Parliaments/Chambers chose the option “Other” and provided additional details. Eleven of these mentioned that security and defence should be a priority (Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Latvian *Saeima*, Polish *Sejm*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Slovenian *Državni zbor* and the European Parliament). Competitiveness was mentioned by four Parliaments/Chambers (Finnish *Eduskunta*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Slovenian *Državni zbor* and the European Parliament) and support to Ukraine was mentioned by two Parliaments/Chambers (Estonian *Riigikogu* and Finnish *Eduskunta*).

The Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat* answered that priority should also be given to strengthen Europe as a business location, to achieve climate targets, generate growth and employment, expand shared infrastructure, reduce disproportionate regulation, migration, and further development of the European research area. They also underlined the importance of enlargement efforts as well as the need to strengthen an open strategic autonomy of the European Union.

For the Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas* the priority areas should in addition also include the single market and values including human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity via humanitarian and development aid.

The Slovak *Národná rada* placed particular emphasis on digital transformation, although it did not select this option among the multiple-choice alternatives.

Other topics mentioned were the Connecting Europe Facility (Latvian *Saeima*), the rule of law and maintaining the rate of customs duty collection fees (Dutch *Tweede Kamer*).

At the EU level, the European Parliament noted that its [resolution of 7 May 2025 on a revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world](#) identified the main priorities for the next MFF. Among many, the main priorities identified were a reinforcement of strategic autonomy, defence and competitiveness, while continuing support to cohesion policy and agriculture.

2. In the second question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they had discussed the flexibility of the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to respond to crises. All Parliaments/Chambers provided a response.

The responses were split almost evenly on this question, with just over half (19 out of 36) responding that discussion had taken place around the flexibility of the current MFF to respond to crises (Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Danish *Folketing*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, French *Sénat*, German *Bundestag*, German *Bundesrat*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Latvian *Saeima*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Polish *Senat*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Romanian *Senat*, Slovenian *Državni zbor*, Swedish *Riksdag* and the European Parliament).

The remaining 17 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that it had not been discussed.

2.1 Parliaments/Chambers who had discussed the flexibility of the current MFF to respond to crises were then asked to share their opinion on this matter. A total number of 18 Parliaments/Chambers provided a response.

Across the range of opinions expressed, 12 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they were in support of flexibility mechanisms (Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, French *Sénat*, German *Bundestag*, German *Bundesrat*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Polish *Senat*, Romanian *Senat* and the European Parliament).

One opinion highlights that the need to amend the MFF to respond swiftly to changing circumstances can consume resources and limit the decisiveness of the EU. This view aligned with the view of some other respondents. The Estonian *Riigikogu* described flexibility as supporting a better budgetary response to changing circumstances, thereby decreasing the need to amend the MFF. The German *Bundestag* acknowledged a need for realignment of the MFF with increased flexibility and streamlined structure.

While welcoming greater flexibility in the MFF, the Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati* stated that flexibility must be within a well-structured framework. Likewise, while in favour of increased flexibility the French *Sénat* cautioned that a balance must be found between flexibility and the

need for predictability and stability. Further, in the response it was underlined that increased flexibility must not result in uncertainty about Member States' contributions (French *Sénat*).

Four of the opinions expressed some reservation towards aspects of increased flexibility (Austrian *Nationalrat*, German *Bundesrat*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica* and the European Parliament). The Austrian *Nationalrat* replied that it views the existing built-in flexibility as sufficient, and that additional flexibility generally comes at the cost of budgetary discipline. Further, one Parliament/Chamber cautioned against allowing transfer of funds between programmes, particularly where this impacts Member States budgetary planning (German *Bundesrat*)

Specific reference was made by two respondents to the proposed single fund approach to Cohesion Policy and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Reservations were expressed around this proposed approach (Italian *Senato della Repubblica*), with a further view shared that while cohesion funding should have a degree of flexibility to the extent that it may react to unforeseen circumstances, it should not compromise its primary objective of economic, social and territorial cohesion (European Parliament).

3. The third question in this chapter sought views on flexibility mechanisms contained within the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), specifically asking Parliaments/Chambers whether flexibility mechanisms should be limited to specific areas, such as disaster relief or defence, or if flexibility mechanisms should be applied across the entire budget. There was also an option for “no opinion”.

Just over half (19 out of 36) of the responses received returned no opinion as to whether flexibility mechanisms contained in the upcoming MFF ought to be applied to specific areas, versus whether they should be applied across the entire budget (Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants*, Belgian *Senaat/Sénat*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Czech *Senát*, Danish *Folketing*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer* and *Tweede Kamer*, French *Assemblée nationale*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Latvian *Saeima*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Polish *Sejm*, Slovenian *Državni zbor*, Spanish *Congreso de los Diputados* and Swedish *Riksdag*).

Of the responses which selected one of the two available options, 10 Parliaments/Chambers responded that flexibility measures should be applied across the entire budget (Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, German *Bundesrat*, Polish *Senat*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor*, Slovak *Národná rada*, and the European Parliament).

The six remaining Parliaments/Chambers took the view that flexibility measures should be limited to specific areas (Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*,

Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, French *Sénat*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica* and Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*).

4. Parliaments/Chambers were then asked if they **would consider supporting the introduction of a mid-term mandatory review of the MFF by the European Commission every 3 or 4 years**. The question was answered by thirty-five Parliaments/Chambers, the Czech *Senát* did not address the question.

Twenty Parliaments/Chambers replied “No opinion”, while 12 replied positively (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, French *Assemblée nationale*, French *Sénat*, German *Bundesrat*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Polish *Senat*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor*, Romanian *Senat* and the European Parliament). Only three Parliaments/Chambers selected the option “only in case of major external events” (Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica* and Slovak *Národná rada*). No Parliaments/Chambers replied negatively.

The Parliaments/Chambers were lastly asked to provide **further information on this chapter, if they so wished**. Three Parliaments/Chambers (Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Danish *Folketing* and the Latvian *Saeima*) stated that a position was not yet adopted on MFF and/or a review was not considered and the Dutch *Eerste Kamer* indicated that it follows the MFF through briefings, debates and reports but it is not its custom to adopt political opinions.

Three members of the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* acted, in 2025, as joint rapporteurs on the MFF, analysing the Commission’s proposals and issuing recommendations, including to continue the rapporteurship in 2025-2029.

The Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon* reported that in October 2025, Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration, Mr Piotr SERAFIN, addressed the competent committees on the 2028-2034 MFF, and this was followed by a broader discussion in the parliament.

The Swedish *Riksdag* reported that its EU Affairs Committee was consulted ahead of Council discussions on the mid-term review of the current long-term budget.

On the topic of **flexibility mechanisms and mid-term mandatory reviews** for the next MFF, the Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* stated that flexibility mechanisms operating across the entire budget would allow faster and more targeted redeployment of funds where needs are greatest, while maintaining predictability through clear rules, transparency requirements and appropriate safeguards. A mandatory mid-term review would also strengthen the MFF’s responsiveness and accountability by allowing a structured assessment of implementation and performance against agreed objectives.

The French *Sénat* stated that while greater MFF flexibility is useful, mandatory mid-term reviews remain necessary, especially in case of enlargement, to safeguard strategic spending, prevent unilateral Commission decisions, and ensure EU defence and autonomy.

The German *Bundestag* clarified that there is no consented opinion in the committee yet concerning the flexibility mechanisms in the next MFF.

For the Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, a tangible review of the MFF would provide the necessary parliamentary oversight and is likely to facilitate a good level of policy.

At the EU level, the European Parliament stated that both the aforementioned resolution on a revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world (2024/2051(INI)) and the draft interim [report 2025/0571R\(APP\) on “the proposal for a Council regulation laying down the Multiannual Financial Framework for the years 2028 to 2034”](#) support a revision mechanism “by July 2031 at the latest”. The INI report also highlights that endowing the MFF “with greater flexibility and response capacity is less likely to require a substantial mid-term revision”.

On the MFF more generally, the Italian *Senato della Repubblica* made it clear that it views the next MFF as a strategic tool to strengthen European resilience, solidarity and global influence, and the Polish *Senat* stated that it proposes increasing the CAP budget, rationalising spending on protection of environment and climate, setting clear milestones for Commission actions, apply the rule of law protection procedure solely on a treaty basis, and including regional authorities in cohesion policy decisions.

CHAPTER TWO


PARLIAMENTARY ENGAGEMENT IN EU FOREIGN AFFAIRS: ENLARGEMENT POLICY

THE SECOND CHAPTER OF THE 45th BI-ANNUAL REPORT concerns the European Union's enlargement policy, which remains a cornerstone of its external action, serving as a key driver for stability, democracy and prosperity in candidate and potential candidate countries. In this context, national Parliaments play an essential role by scrutinising legislative and policy proposals related to enlargement, engaging in dialogue with their governments and EU institutions, and contributing to the political debate on the future of the Union.

This section aims to gather information on how Parliaments/Chambers are involved in the examination of the Commission's proposal on EU enlargement, the procedures they follow during this process, their views on the institutional reforms required for future enlargements, and the mechanisms through which they oversee and support the accession process.

5. In the first question of this chapter, Parliaments/Chambers were asked **whether they had examined the European Commission [2025 Communication on EU enlargement policy \(COM\(2025\) 690\)](#)**.

2025 Communication on EU enlargement examined?



All Parliaments/Chambers responded to this question, of which 16 indicated that they had examined the communication, while 20 indicated that they had not. The Parliaments/Chambers that had examined the communication were the Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Czech *Senát*, Danish *Folketing*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer* and *Eerste Kamer*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, German *Bundestag*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Latvian *Saeima*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Polish *Sejm*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor* and *Senat*, and the European Parliament.

5.1. The Parliaments/Chambers that replied in the affirmative were then asked to indicate the level at which the communication had been examined. Three options were provided: “Plenary”, “Parliamentary Committee”, or “Other”, with the possibility for respondents to briefly specify the alternative option. Respondents could only select one option. In total, 18 Parliaments/Chambers answered this question, including some that provided information on planned or forthcoming examination.

None of the responding Parliaments/Chambers selected the option “Plenary”. Twelve indicated that the examination had taken place at parliamentary committee level: the Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Czech *Senát*, Danish *Folketing*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Latvian *Saeima*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Polish *Sejm*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República* and Romanian *Senat*. Six Parliaments/Chambers (Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, German *Bundestag*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor*, and the European Parliament) selected the option “Other” and provided additional information.

Replies provided under “Other” indicated that examination of the communication was taking place through a variety of formats and arrangements or was still ongoing or planned. The Dutch *Tweede Kamer* reported that examination formed part of a written debate related to the General Affairs Council of 16 December 2025. This was complemented by a technical briefing on the enlargement package by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held in January 2026, while a dedicated committee debate on EU enlargement is planned but has not yet taken place. The German *Bundestag* referred to scrutiny taking place in several formats, including at plenary and committee levels, as well as through informal exchanges with civil society and members of other parliaments. The Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor* noted that the scrutiny procedure is currently ongoing, with examination taking place first at committee level and subsequently in plenary, including consultation with the government and the adoption of a plenary opinion at the end of the procedure.

The Italian *Camera dei Deputati* and the Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati* indicated that the communication has not yet been examined; however, examination at committee level is foreseen in the near future.

Lastly, the European Parliament reported that examination was taking place mainly at committee level, including the presentation of the 2025 enlargement package in the Committee

on Foreign Affairs (AFET) by the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Ms Marta KOS, in November 2025, the preparation of country reports, and the adoption, in January 2026, by AFET of a general report on the EU enlargement strategy.

5.2. In a second follow-up question, the Parliaments/Chambers that had examined the communication were asked whether they had consulted their government before or during the examination. Fifteen Parliaments/Chambers replied to this follow-up question, while the European Parliament, which had indicated that it had examined the communication, did not provide an answer. Of those responding, only two—the Portuguese *Assembleia da República* and the Romanian *Senat*—indicated that no consultation had taken place; the remaining respondents reported that consultation with the government had occurred.

5.3. In a third follow-up question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked whether they had adopted a political opinion in the framework of the political dialogue. Only two (Hungarian *Országgyűlés* and Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor*) replied in the affirmative.

6. The next question in this chapter asked Parliaments/Chambers to identify the reforms they believed were necessary for the EU to better integrate new members. Respondents could select one or more of three pre-defined options and were also given the possibility to briefly specify additional reforms under “Other”. Thirty-three Parliaments/Chambers replied to this question, while three (Belgian *Senaat/Sénat*, Spanish *Cortes Generales* and Swedish *Riksdag*) did not provide an answer.

Among the available response options, “Adjustments to the EU budget” was the most frequently selected, with 21 Parliaments/Chambers choosing this option. This was followed by the possibility to specify additional reforms under “Other”, which was chosen by 20 Parliaments/Chambers. “Streamlined decision-making procedures” was selected by 17 Parliaments/Chambers, while “Reform of European Parliament seat allocation” was selected by seven Parliaments/Chambers. As multiple answers were possible, more than half of the responding Parliaments/Chambers (18 out of 33) selected more than one option, while 15 selected only one option.

Replies provided under the option “Other” reflected a broad range of additional perspectives on reforms considered necessary by Parliaments/Chambers to facilitate the integration of new members. Below is a non-exhaustive overview of ideas put forward by Parliaments/Chambers. For the full responses, the annex to the report can be consulted.

The Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat* emphasised the need to safeguard the effective functioning of EU institutions and supported gradual and phased integration of candidate countries into specific political, administrative and sectoral areas of the EU, including

participation in selected EU policies and programmes, while underlining the importance of maintaining labour and social standards.

The Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants* highlighted the need to adapt governance rules and institutional frameworks to safeguard the EU's capacity to act.

The Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* emphasised the need for institutional, administrative and budgetary preparedness for future enlargement, alongside strengthened pre-accession support and closer EU-national administrative cooperation. It further stressed the importance of safeguarding adequate representation of small Member States in the European Parliament seat allocation reform.

The Danish *Folketing* noted that views differ between political parties but indicated that a broad majority supports modernisation of the upcoming Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and streamlining of EU decision-making procedures within the current Treaty framework.

The Dutch *Tweede Kamer* indicated that a position has not yet been adopted and referred to a report prepared by appointed rapporteurs of the EU Affairs Committee, published in October 2025, highlighting the need to prepare for a possible future enlargement and to define a position on the reforms considered necessary. It also noted that the report examined issues including the EU budget, decision-making procedures and rule of law instruments.

The Dutch *Eerste Kamer* indicated that it has not adopted an opinion on this matter, while noting that enlargement is a priority within its Committee for European Affairs and that decision-making procedures in the context of enlargement are a recurring theme in the debate.

The Finnish *Eduskunta* acknowledged that enlargement could increase pressure for reforms to the EU budget, particularly in relation to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and cohesion policy, and could further exacerbate challenges related to unanimity-based decision-making.

The French *Sénat* emphasised the need for substantive and structural reforms to the functioning of the EU, beyond budgetary adjustments and decision-making procedures, in order to strengthen its operational and absorption capacity.

The Hungarian *Országgyűlés* highlighted that candidate countries are at different levels of preparedness and stressed the need to ensure an individual, merit-based approach, while underlining the importance of preserving unanimity in Council decision-making.

The Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas* highlighted the need for EU budgetary reform to ensure sustainability in the context of enlargement, including budgetary adaptation, alongside streamlined decision-making procedures to preserve the Union's capacity to act decisively, particularly in security and foreign policy.

The Latvian *Saeima* supported a merit-based enlargement process and stressed the need for the EU to prepare for just and effective functioning in an enlarged Union.

The Lithuanian *Seimas* called for timely EU preparation for enlargement, prioritising the adaptation of sectoral policies and the EU budget, while underlining that institutional reforms should not delay or precede the enlargement process.

The Polish *Senat* emphasised the need for further assessment of the financial resources required for integrating new Member States, noting that the alignment of rural and agricultural policies, including in relation to Ukraine, could be costly and time-consuming.

The European Parliament emphasised the need to strengthen the EU's capacity to act in the context of enlargement, including through extending qualified majority voting to certain accession-related decisions and considering institutional reforms to ensure the effective functioning of EU institutions in an enlarged Union, inter alia with regard to the composition of the European Commission, the size of the European Parliament and the system of rotating Council presidencies. It also referred to its [resolution of 22 October 2025 on the institutional consequences of the EU enlargement negotiations \(2025/2041\(INI\)\)](#) and highlighted the importance of gradual integration and early involvement of candidate countries, alongside reforms to key institutional and decision-making frameworks, strengthening democratic legitimacy, and reinforcing interparliamentary cooperation.

7. In the following question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked to indicate **which tools they use to oversee the enlargement process**. Multiple answers were permitted. Respondents could select one or more of four pre-defined options and could also briefly specify additional tools under “Other”. All Parliaments/Chambers responded to this question.

Among the available response options, “Scrutiny of government action in the Council” was the most frequently selected tool, chosen by 30 Parliaments/Chambers. This was followed by “Regular dialogues with candidate country parliaments”, selected by 16 Parliaments/Chambers, “Thematic hearings and debates”, selected by 15 Parliaments/Chambers, and “Pre-accession monitoring reports”, selected by 14 Parliaments/Chambers. As multiple answers were permitted, a majority of respondents (26 out of 36) selected more than one option.

Furthermore, 13 Parliaments/Chambers selected the option “Other” and provided information on additional tools and practices. Among them, the Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna* indicated the absence of a position following recent parliamentary elections, noting that (COM(2025) 690) had not been deliberated. The replies submitted under this option illustrate a wide range of tools and practices employed to oversee and scrutinise the enlargement process. These are outlined below.

The Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants* reported overseeing the enlargement process through periodic discussions during parliamentary meetings and through government briefings.

The Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* indicated that it monitors the enlargement process primarily through the European Commission's pre-accession monitoring and progress reports, complemented by information obtained through interparliamentary contacts with candidate country parliaments, including meetings at the level of Speakers/Presidents of Parliaments and European Affairs Committee Chairs, as well as exchanges through parliamentary friendship groups.

The Czech *Senát* reported maintaining ad hoc contacts with candidate country parliaments.

The Dutch *Tweede Kamer* stated that its EU Affairs Committee appointed rapporteurs on EU enlargement for 2024–2025, who engaged with external experts and stakeholders, gathered input from academic, administrative and political sources, and organised targeted exchanges, including a round table discussion and meetings with the European Commissioner for Enlargement.

The French *Sénat* referred to regular parliamentary missions to candidate countries, interparliamentary cooperation (notably with the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, including remote training activities and the hosting of parliamentary officials), and thematic scrutiny work within the European Affairs Committee, with a 2026 focus on negotiations with Montenegro and Albania leading to the publication of an information report.

The German *Bundestag* mentioned committee visits to candidate countries, dialogue with civil society and the European Commission, and the hosting of interparliamentary dialogue platforms involving candidate countries, including within the framework of the Parliamentary Dimension of the Berlin Process.

The German *Bundesrat* reported using information provided by the government on the progress of candidate countries in the enlargement process.

The Hungarian *Országgyűlés* reported parliamentary capacity-building activities, including participation in EU-funded twinning, technical assistance and Inter-Pares programmes, and noted its current involvement in the implementation of the third Moldovan Parliamentary Twinning Programme, launched in February 2025.

The Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas* indicated that parliamentary questions constitute a key tool for overseeing the enlargement process, enabling Members to require Ministers to report on accession negotiations, explain Ireland's position on enlargement, account for candidate countries' preparedness and related EU reforms, and outline Ireland's bilateral support to candidate countries.

The Italian *Camera dei Deputati* referred to hearings and debates on EU enlargement held within the competent committees, including joint meetings, which may lead to the adoption of resolutions on the issue.

The Slovenian *Državni zbor* indicated that the competent committee debates and adopts opinions on Slovenia's position on draft EU common positions for the opening and provisional closure of accession negotiating chapters.

The European Parliament reported maintaining regular contacts with the national Parliaments of all enlargement countries through its Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), including exchanges of views, joint meetings, official missions and bilateral contacts between Members of the European Parliament and Members of national Parliaments. It also indicated sustained and systematic engagement in democracy support activities, including parliamentary capacity-building, mediation and dialogue, human rights actions and election observation.

In the **last question of this chapter, Parliaments/Chambers were invited to share any additional information**, if they so wished. In total, eight Parliaments/Chambers did so: the French *Sénat*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Latvian *Saeima*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Polish *Senat*, Spanish *Cortes Generales* and the Swedish *Riksdag*.

Some of the replies (Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, Polish *Senat*, Spanish *Cortes Generales* and Swedish *Riksdag*) emphasised the role of direct contacts with candidate countries, and described the nature of these contacts in their respective case.

The French *Sénat* noted that (COM(2025) 690) had not been formally referred to it and that the European Affairs Committee held a hearing with the European Commissioner for Enlargement in October 2025. Similarly, the Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés* informed that deliberation on (COM(2025) 690) had not yet taken place.

The Italian *Senato della Repubblica* outlined its views on EU enlargement policy and process more broadly, and underlined the role of parliamentary diplomacy, dialogue and cooperation within COSAC in supporting enlargement.

The Latvian *Saeima* referred to the scrutiny and approval of government positions by the European Affairs Committee ahead of Council meetings, including on the enlargement process.

CHAPTER THREE

SCRUTINY OF EU LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS BY NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

THE THIRD CHAPTER OF THE 45th BI-ANNUAL REPORT starts from the observation that the scrutiny of EU legislative proposals by national Parliaments represents a cornerstone of parliamentary involvement in the Union's decision-making process. Effective scrutiny not only strengthens democratic accountability but also ensures that EU legislation reflects the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality while remaining closely aligned with national priorities and concerns.

This chapter seeks to explore how Parliaments organise and conduct scrutiny, the analytical capacities and expertise available to them and the extent of coordination with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs).

Section I. Subsidiarity Assessments and Analytical Capacity

Under protocol No 2 to the Treaty on European Union, national Parliaments are entrusted with ensuring that draft EU legislative acts comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Conducting these assessments requires both procedural clarity and adequate analytical capacity, particularly when proposals are of a technical or complex nature. This section examines the practice of selecting legislative initiatives for examination, the procedures followed, the sources used, and the adequacy of information provided by the Commission.

8. In the first question of this chapter, Parliaments/Chambers were asked **if they scrutinise the Commission Work Programme (CWP)**. Only four (Austrian *Nationalrat* and *Bundesrat*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, French *Assemblée nationale* and Spanish *Cortes Generales*) replied that they do not scrutinise the CWP systematically.

8.1. Parliaments/Chambers were then asked **how the topics or legislative initiatives listed in the CWP were allocated within their Parliament/Chamber for scrutiny**. Respondents could choose one or several of six pre-defined replies, and/or to briefly specify the procedure with their own words. The most commonly chosen response was that the Committee on European Affairs examined the entire CWP; 18 Parliaments/Chambers chose this option, with ten choosing the second most frequently indicated response that each sectoral committee autonomously selected relevant CWP initiatives for scrutiny. Seven Parliaments/Chambers

furthermore indicated that the Committee on European Affairs examined the entire CWP and distributed individual topics to competent standing committees.

In addition, 17 Parliaments/Chambers chose to describe the process using their own words. Several respondents took the opportunity to elaborate on how the topics or legislative initiatives listed in the CWP were allocated within their Parliament/Chamber. The German *Bundesrat* noted that in their case, it is the President who is the competent organ to decide upon the allocation of EU relating items to the committees. Similarly, the Swedish *Riksdag* indicated that it is the Committee on Foreign Affairs rather than the Committee on EU Affairs that is responsible for scrutiny of the CWP. The Italian *Camera dei Deputati* marked that while the Committee on European Policies is responsible for subsidiarity and proportionality checks, the sectoral committees are tasked with examining the substantive content of proposals.

In the *Tweede Kamer* of the Netherlands, the Committee on European Affairs coordinates the procedure of prioritisation before the total list of priorities is voted on in the plenary. In the *Eerste Kamer* of the same country, the process is slightly different: there, the initiatives listed in the CWP are circulated to the political groups who then indicate which initiatives they wish to prioritise. On the basis of this list, committees select priority initiatives in their field. The Committee on European Affairs has a coordinating role and the *Eerste Kamer* adopts the final work programme in plenary session. The system in the *Chambre des Députés* in Luxembourg also gives the European Affairs Committee a coordinating role; it invites sectoral committees to identify initiatives, and the Conference of Presidents then chooses five to six prioritised files that are examined more thoroughly. In the Lithuanian *Seimas*, the Committee on European Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Affairs collect conclusions from the sectoral committees regarding the relevance of the proposals in the CWP. Based on this and on the opinion of the Lithuanian government, the Committee on European Affairs and the Committee on Foreign Affairs annually prepare and adopt a joint opinion on the priorities of the *Seimas* in relation to the CWP. The European Affairs Committee of the Italian *Camera dei Deputati* examines the entire CWP, together with the government planning report on Italian participation in the EU and the Council trio programme; it is then referred to the plenary. Each sectoral committee examines specific CWP aspects in order to issue an opinion to the European Affairs Committee. In the Danish *Folketing*, 10-15 prioritised EU proposals are chosen each year by the European Affairs Committee, based in part on the CWP. These proposals are subjected to a more in-depth scrutiny in the *Folketing*. The selection is discussed with both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the sectoral committees and adopted by the European Affairs Committee. In the Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, the scrutiny procedure includes a public hearing as well as the involvement of the standing parliamentary committees before a resolution is adopted in plenary session .

In the Slovenian *Državni zbor*, the entire CWP is examined by the Committee on EU Affairs. Some of the topics are also addressed at meetings of sectoral committees as part of their exchanges with the relevant Commissioners. In the case of Malta, the Foreign and European Affairs Committee of the *Kamra tad-Deputati* scrutinises the government position on the CWP, and a presentation is also given by the Permanent Representative to the European Union about

the CWP to the committee. In the Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, the Committee on European Affairs usually discusses the CWP and may also adopt opinions; the last opinion was adopted in 2023. The European Affairs Committee of the Latvian *Saeima* selects several priority files from the CWP. The Latvian government is required to consult the committee before developing its initial position on any of the selected files. In the European Union Affairs Committee of the Polish *Senat*, committee experts provide evaluation and suggestions to the committee ahead of its scrutiny of the CWP.

9. Following this, Parliaments/Chambers were asked whether they rely on in-house experts to analyse legislative proposals. They had the possibility to choose one or several of five pre-defined replies, and/or to specify another reply with their own words. 16 Parliaments/Chambers replied that there was a dedicated internal team of experts for this purpose, and 13 replied that analysis is carried out by committee secretariats or legal services. Five (Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, German *Bundesrat*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer* and Swedish *Riksdag*) indicated that analysis is provided by the government and four (Belgian *Senaat/Sénat*, Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, German *Bundesrat*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer* and Slovenian *Državni zbor*) indicated that such analysis is not systematically carried out.

In addition, 16 respondents took the opportunity to provide additional information by choosing the option “Other”. These were mainly clarifications on how the analysis is carried out (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Danish *Folketing*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, German *Bundesrat* and *Bundestag*, Polish *Senat*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, and the European Parliament), how contacts with the government are handled (Latvian *Saeima*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor*, and Swedish *Riksdag*) or what kind of external actors the administration may be in contact with for this purpose (Italian *Senato della Repubblica* and *Camera dei Deputati*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, and Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor*).

10. In the next question, Parliaments/Chambers were also asked how they ensure adequate analysis and support for scrutiny when confronted with EU legislative proposals of high complexity or strategic importance. They could choose from one or several of four pre-defined alternatives or briefly specify another option by choosing “Other”. Almost all (29) indicated that they do so by requesting explanatory material from their government or Permanent Representation, and a large number (21) indicated that they consult external experts such as academics or stakeholders. A smaller number (11) indicated that they assign such proposals to specialised staff or advisors. Three (Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna* and *Senát*, and Slovenian *Državni zbor*) indicated that no special approach is followed. Eleven respondents chose “Other” and provided information in writing on how they address particularly complex files. The involvement of different forms of external actors were mentioned by several (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Czech *Senát*, Danish *Folketing*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, Italian

Senato della Repubblica, Dutch *Tweede Kamer*). For example, the Dutch *Tweede Kamer* provided information on an ongoing experiment with an “EU-scientific assessment”, whereby two academics execute a “national impact assessment” on a legislative EU proposal in a very early stage, as a compliment to the impact assessment provided by the Commission and giving the committees more specific and detail information on the impact and potential difficulties in implementing the proposed legislation for the Netherlands. In another case, the Latvian *Saeima* explained that in cases of particular complexity or importance, the committee devotes additional meetings to assess the item, involving stakeholders, NGOs, and representatives of the wider public administration. A similar approach was reported by several Parliaments/Chambers. For the full set of replies, the reader is referred to the Annex.

11. Parliaments/Chambers were then also asked which sources of information or analytical tools they consult when conducting subsidiarity assessments. Like before, they could choose from one or several of five pre-defined alternatives or briefly specify another option by choosing “Other”. The most frequently chosen option was “Input from the government”, which 31 respondents had indicated. 30 respondents furthermore indicated that they used reasoned opinions and comments from other national Parliaments via IPEX. Moreover, 24 Parliaments/Chambers replied that they made use of the Commission’s explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal, and 24 indicated they use the Commission’s impact assessment. Internal services or legal/policy experts were used by 23 Parliaments/Chambers, according to the responses to the questionnaire. A fewer number, ten Parliaments/Chambers (Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants* and *Senaat/Sénat*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Czech *Senát*, French *Sénat*, German *Bundestag*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, and Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor* and *Senat*) replied that they used external academic or third-party analyses.

Six Parliaments/Chambers provided information by choosing the option “Other”. The Croatian *Hrvatski sabor* simply noted that it rarely conducts subsidiarity checks, and the German *Bundestag* added that stakeholder analysis is another tool they used. The Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie* explained that the Committee on EU Affairs holds a Stakeholder Council on relevant topics, which includes participation from employers, trade unions, non-governmental and other organisations, in addition to consulting the government, external experts and relevant stakeholders. The Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* explained in somewhat more detail how it conducts subsidiarity assessments, including that it draws on the Commission’s explanatory memorandum and impact assessment, together with any relevant reasoned opinions and comments from other national Parliaments available via IPEX. The European Affairs Service analyses these sources and provides support to the competent standing committee. In the context of committee examination, the relevant government departments or ministries and, where appropriate, affected stakeholders are invited to present their views, and additional information is obtained through written contributions and/or oral briefings. The Italian *Senato della Repubblica* elaborated on its process and explained that twenty days from the transmission of a proposal, an analytical report is provided by the government. This includes

an assessment of compliance with the principles of subsidiarity, proportionality and attribution, a negotiation outlook, and an analysis of financial, legal, administrative, and societal impacts. The report also includes a correspondence table between the proposal and existing national legislation.

For its part, the European Parliament referred to its [resolution of 27 November 2025 on the application of the Treaty provisions related to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process \(2025/2042\(INI\)\)](#) and the observations made therein about the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the role of the Commission, the national Parliaments and the Court of Justice of the European Union in the process.

12. Further on the subject, Parliaments/Chambers were also asked if they continue to follow the progress of a proposal in the EU legislative process after submitting a reasoned opinion or political dialogue contribution on a legislative proposal. Seventeen replied that they do so in all cases, and 13 replied that they do so in selected/high-priority cases. Five replied that they do not do so.

12.1. The Parliaments/Chambers who had replied yes to the previous question were then asked what kind of follow-up they carry out on a legislative proposal after submitting an opinion and receiving a reply from the Commission. They could choose one or several of seven pre-defined alternatives or briefly specify another option by choosing “Other”.

The most commonly chosen reply was that the Parliament/Chamber continued tracking the file via IPEX; 22 respondents indicated this. Almost as many (21) indicated that they requested updates from the national government. Slightly fewer (15) indicated that they requested updates from the national Permanent Representation in Brussels, and almost the same amount (14) indicated that they continued the scrutiny through parliamentary committee meetings. A similar number of Parliaments/Chambers (13) indicated that they would follow discussions in the European Parliament. Somewhat fewer (9) indicated that they would follow changes to the legislative text in Council working groups, while a comparable number (8) indicated that they prepared follow-up contributions if needed.

Lastly, nine Parliaments/Chambers chose the option “Other” and provided more detailed information. The Dutch *Eerste Kamer* reported that the file on the proposal on their website would be updated with the state of play of the procedures in the relevant European institutions, and in the Swedish *Riksdag* the administration monitors the outcome of the legislative process, informs the committee secretariat when a legislative act has been adopted, and informs the committee secretariat and the Speaker of the Commission’s response to a reasoned opinion. In the Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, occasional work visits to Brussels to gather information take place. The Danish *Folketing* reported that follow-up differs from case to case and scrutiny may


continue until the Council has agreed on a common position or even until there is an agreement between the Council and the EP. In the German *Bundesrat*, the EU Committee may decide to issue a subsequent opinion if it has the view that certain aspects of the initial opinion were not duly taken into account by the Commission or in the ongoing legislative process. In the Finnish *Eduskunta*, the government is obliged to give updates without any request and the *Eduskunta* is involved throughout the process in all EU legislative files. The Czech *Senát* gave a comprehensive overview of its monitoring procedures. They result in an annual report focusing on whether the government took its resolutions into account and what the current state of legislative negotiations is. In a few cases, the *Senát* continued the scrutiny and adopted follow-up contributions. On its part, the Italian *Senato della Repubblica* clarified that it often reviews the responses provided by the Commission or the government to its resolutions on draft legislative acts. By examining how its observations and recommendations have been taken into account, the committee is able to monitor the developments of the proposal and maintain a consistent parliamentary position. This follow-up also allows for renewed discussion, ensuring that the national interest is effectively represented in the evolving European legislative process. Finally, the Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie* pointed out that for the moment the *Narodno sabranie* does not have a Permanent Representation to the European Parliament.

Section II. Coordination with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)

Given that the European Parliament and the Council act as co-legislators, coordination between national Parliaments and MEPs can enhance coherence and improve the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny. This section examines the forms of information exchange and cooperation between national Parliaments and their MEPs, as well as possible initiatives to strengthen such interaction.

13.1. The first question of this section concerned whether **Parliaments/Chambers exchange information with MEPs from their country regarding EU legislative proposals examined at the national level.**

A majority of 28 Parliaments/Chambers replied that such exchanges take place, with only seven (Belgian *Senaat/Sénat*, Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, German *Bundesrat*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer* and Swedish *Riksdag*) replying with “no” to this question.



13.1. Parliaments/Chambers who replied “yes” were also asked whether **this process was provided for under the constitution of their country or under the rules of procedure** of their Parliament/Chamber. None of those who replied stated that the process was provided for under their constitution, but the Portuguese *Assembleia da República* provided a reference to its general competences regarding EU matters as set out in the constitution of Portugal. Sixteen Parliaments/Chambers replied that their rules of procedures (or the equivalent) contained guidance on how exchanges of information with MEPs could or should take place; several of those who replied also provided a reference to these rules, or gave a brief description of their content.

13.2. In a second follow-up question, Parliaments/Chambers were furthermore asked **in which ways this exchange of information usually takes place**. Respondents could choose one or several of five pre-defined alternatives or briefly specify another option by choosing “Other”. Twenty Parliaments/Chambers replied that an exchange takes place through informal contacts, and 18 indicated that MEPs attend national committee meetings. A further 17 Parliaments/chambers indicated that exchanges take place through the national Parliament’s representation in Brussels. Thirteen replied that formal meetings are used. A smaller number, seven Parliaments/Chambers, indicated that an exchange takes place through written communication or reports shared with MEPs.

Five Parliaments/Chambers (Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Czech *Senát*, Danish *Folketing*, German *Bundestag* and Italian *Camera dei Deputati*) provided information in their own words by choosing “Other”. The Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* explained that exchanges of views may take place through political groups or party channels, and the Czech *Senát* also noted that

most exchanges take place through internal communication within political groups. The German *Bundestag* remarked that the political groups maintain their own liaison offices in Brussels.

The Danish *Folketing* for its part used the opportunity to explain that the exchange of information in their case takes place through six annual joint meetings between Danish MEPs and members of the European Affairs Committee. The Italian *Camera dei Deputati* also noted that within the framework of the scrutiny of a legislative proposal, Italian MEPs can be heard in a public hearing by the relevant committees.

14. Parliaments/Chambers were also asked if MEPs from their country inform the Parliament/Chamber on the outcome of discussions in the European Parliament on EU proposals previously scrutinised at national level. Twenty-five Parliaments/Chambers replied no, and nine (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Danish *Folketing*, German *Bundestag*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Lithuanian *Seimas* and Polish *Senat*) replied yes.

15. In the next question, Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they had taken any initiatives to strengthen cooperation or information-sharing with MEPs. While 11 Parliaments/Chambers replied no, five (Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Italian *Camera dei Deputati*, and Polish *Sejm* and *Senat*) replied “no, but such initiatives are being considered.” A majority of Parliaments/Chambers (19) however replied that such initiatives had been taken, and provided a brief overview of their actions in this regard. Many replies explained the different ways in which MEPs are invited to participate in meetings and proceedings within the Parliament/Chamber (Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants* and *Senaat/Sénat*, Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Danish *Folketing*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, German *Bundestag*, Latvian *Saeima*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati* and Portuguese *Assembleia da República*). Some also highlighted visits to Brussels or interparliamentary meetings as opportunities for strengthened cooperation or information-sharing with MEPs (Estonian *Riigikogu*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer* and *Eerste Kamer*, and Spanish *Cortes Generales*). Some also pointed out that they share newsletters, briefings and other information material with the MEPs from their countries (Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, French *Sénat*, and Dutch *Tweede Kamer* and *Eerste Kamer*).

The last question of this chapter was an invitation to Parliaments/Chambers to provide **any additional information**, if they wished. Eight Parliaments/Chambers took this opportunity, all of them providing more information about the nature of contacts between MEPs and their Parliament/Chamber. The Cyprus: Cypriot *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer* and the Swedish *Riksdag* all emphasised in their replies that contacts between MEPs and national Members of Parliament may also take place in an informal way or through political parties. The Italian *Senato della Repubblica* and the Romanian *Senat* pointed to recently introduced provisions for strengthened exchange and

ongoing discussions to do so, respectively. The Finnish *Eduskunta* and the French *Assemblée nationale* both provided more in-depth information on how exchange with MEPs takes place in practice.

CHAPTER FOUR

USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) TOOLS IN PARLIAMENTS

IN THE FOURTH AND LAST CHAPTER OF THE 45th BI-ANNUAL REPORT, the fact that emerging AI tools are increasingly being explored by national Parliaments to improve internal workflows, facilitate timely scrutiny of EU proposals, and support Members and staff in managing growing legislative complexity is being addressed. As these technologies evolve, they present both opportunities and challenges for parliamentary institutions, raising questions about efficiency, ethics, transparency, and governance. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which Parliaments/Chambers are integrating AI into their daily operations, the areas in which such tools are applied, the challenges encountered, and the measures adopted to ensure responsible and effective use of AI in parliamentary environments.

16. In the first question of this chapter, **Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they had developed or adopted any AI tools to support its work.** Out of the 36 respondents 17 answered that tools had been externally developed or that commercially available tools were used (Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants* and *Senaat/Sénat*, Czech *Senát*, Danish *Folketing*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, French *Sénat*, German *Bundesrat*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer*, Polish *Senat*, Slovenian *Državni zbor*, Swedish *Riksdag*, and the European Parliament). Twelve Parliaments/Chambers answered that one or more tools had been developed in-house specifically for parliamentary use (Austrian *Bundesrat and Nationalrat*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, French *Assemblée nationale*, German *Bundestag*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Polish *Sejm*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Spanish *Cortes Generales* and the European Parliament). Four Parliaments/Chambers furthermore answered that they had not developed or adopted any AI tools to support its work, but that AI adoption was being considered (Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Latvian *Saeima* and Dutch *Tweede Kamer*). Finally, five Parliaments/Chambers answered that there were no plans to use AI tools (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, Romanian *Camera Deputaților*, Romanian *Senat*, and Slovak *Národná rada*).

16.1 As a follow-up question **Parliaments/Chambers who had answered positively were asked to indicate the purpose of the AI tools.** Thirty Parliaments/Chambers responded to this question and multiple answers were possible.

Eighteen Parliaments/Chambers indicated that the purpose of the AI tools were drafting and/or summarising documents (Austrian *Bundesrat and Nationalrat*, Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants* and *Senaat/Sénat*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, French *Assemblée nationale* and *Sénat*, German *Bundesrat*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Polish *Sejm*, Spanish *Cortes Generales*, Swedish *Riksdag*, and the European Parliament). Sixteen indicated that the purpose of AI tools were research and/or information retrieval (Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants* and *Senaat/Sénat*, Czech *Senát* and *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, French *Sénat*, German *Bundesrat*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Spanish *Cortes Generales*, Swedish *Riksdag* and the European Parliament) and 14 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that the purpose of AI tools were supporting translation or multilingual access (Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants* and *Senaat/Sénat*, Czech *Senát*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, French *Sénat*, German *Bundesrat*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Polish *Sejm*, Spanish *Cortes Generales*, Swedish *Riksdag* and the European Parliament). In addition, five Parliaments/Chambers indicated that the purpose of AI tools were analysing legislative proposals (Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants* and *Senaat/Sénat*, French *Sénat*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica* and Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*), two Parliaments/Chambers indicated that the purpose of AI tools were tracking EU legislation (French *Sénat* and Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*) and no Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they had used it for managing citizen correspondence.

Besides the above indications 19 Parliaments/Chambers also further specified the purpose of the AI tools in use. Four functions in particular were repeatedly mentioned, namely supporting administrative tasks and functions, helping with transcriptions, helping with cybersecurity and analysing as well as processing legislative work.

Two Parliaments/chambers elaborated how AI tools were used in terms of cybersecurity. The Dutch *Eerste Kamer* explained how several AI-tools were used to detect network traffic patterns and anomalies in terms of cybersecurity. Similarly, the Slovenian *Državni zbor* elaborated on the function of the program WithSecure Elements XDR, which is a cloud-based Extended Detection and Response (XDR) solution using AI-supported analytics, used for strengthening cybersecurity. Furthermore, five Parliaments/Chambers indicated that AI was used to support administrative tasks and functions (Danish *Folketing*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Lithuanian *Seimas* and Polish *Sejm*). AI tools were for example used in administrative tasks for parliamentary proceedings (Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*) and scheduling plenary and committee meetings (Polish *Sejm*). Moreover, the Danish *Folketing* specified how general purpose AI tools (Microsoft Copilot) had been made available for the parliament administration staff to use as part of their daily work.

Five Parliaments/Chambers also indicated that AI was used for analysing and processing legislative work. The Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon* exemplified how AI was used in the documentation and management of legislative bills, and the German *Bundestag* described how AI was used for automated tagging and classification. Similarly, the French *Assemblée nationale* and *Sénat* used AI tools for processing amendments and specifically in terms of sorting and classifying amendments. In addition, the Italian *Senato della Repubblica* gave concrete examples of what different AI-programs were used for. These included TeSeo for classifying bills and assigning metadata, Linkoln for recognising legislative references and GEM for managing, analyzing, editing, and semi-automatically processing amendments.

Finally, 11 of the 19 Parliaments/Chambers who explained the purpose of their AI tools mentioned how it was used for transcription. The Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer*, Polish *Senat*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República* and the Spanish *Cortes Generales* indicated and specified that AI tools were used for transcription of plenary sessions, and a few respondents also mentioned transcription of committee meetings. In addition, the Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Polish *Sejm*, Slovenian *Državni zbor* and the Spanish *Cortes Generales* indicated that AI tools for speech-to-text transcription were being used or under development.

For the full set of responses, the annex to the report can be consulted.

16.2 Further to this question Parliaments/Chambers were also asked about the main challenges or risks Parliaments/Chambers face in adopting AI-based tools.

Multiple answers were possible and out of the 33 respondents a majority of 26 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that accuracy and/or reliability issues were one of the main risks or challenges, 22 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that data protection and legal and/or ethical concerns were one of the main risks or challenges, 16 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that budgetary constraints were one of the main risks or challenges and 11 Parliaments/Chambers indicated that lack of tailored tools for parliamentary needs were one of the main risks or challenges (Czech *Senát*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, French *Sénat*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer*, Polish *Sejm*, Slovenian *Državni zbor*, Swedish *Riksdag* and the European Parliament). Moreover seven Parliaments/Chambers indicated that a lack of technical expertise was one of the main risks or challenges (Danish *Folketing*, German *Bundestag*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Latvian *Saeima*, Lithuanian *Seimas* and Slovenian *Državni zbor*), seven Parliaments/Chambers indicated that a lack of or difficulty in adopting a formal policy or ethical framework governing AI use was one of the main risks or challenges (Austrian *Bundesrat* and *Nationalrat*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, Slovenian *Državni zbor*, Spanish *Cortes Generales*, and the European Parliament), six Parliaments/Chambers indicated that resistance to change or institutional inertia were one of the main risks or challenges (Belgian *Senaat/Sénat*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, German *Bundestag*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Luxembourg *Chambre des*

Députés, and Slovenian *Državni zbor*) and finally two Parliaments/Chambers indicated that they had no opinion (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie* and Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*).

In addition, five Parliaments/Chambers specified further challenges or risks in adopting AI-based tools. For example, the Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, specified that it did not believe it was a "lack of tailored tools" that was a risk or challenge but rather "serious concerns about the reliability of the responses obtained". In addition to the multiple choices in the questionnaire German *Bundestag* further specified a number of challenges or risks, among others security issues, improving AI literacy among parliamentarians and staff, internal administrative process that do not reflect the general purpose character of Gen AI Systems, and the speed of AI advancements as well as misconceptions and misunderstandings about how AI technologies work or how to value and integrate AI capabilities into daily routines.

Taking the human aspect into account the Spanish *Cortes Generales* among others specified that on the one hand, it must be taken into account that AI-generated summaries require human supervision to correct so-called AI hallucinations. On the other hand, staff must be trained to prevent documents that are not public from being uploaded to platforms that can use the said information to train their LLM models. Finally, internal AI Guidelines have been developed, inspired by the guidelines of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and currently pending final approval in February 2026. These guidelines provide a common framework to ensure responsible, transparent, and ethical use of artificial intelligence within the *Cortes Generales*. In a similar manner, Italian *Senato della Repubblica* specified that they believed the main challenges in adopting AI-based tools in Parliament relate to reliability, accountability, and institutional integrity as generative AI could produce errors, biases or outdated information. Ensuring clear human responsibility was seen as essential, as parliamentary decisions cannot be delegated to machines. Additional risks include data protection and cybersecurity concerns, the opacity of AI models and the potential misuse of AI for procedural obstruction. Finally, the Hungarian *Országgyűlés* clarified that the assessments of the risks and challenges were ongoing at the time of writing.

16.3 Rounding off this set of questions, Parliaments/Chambers were asked which benefits had been observed from the use of AI tools. Thirty-three Parliaments/Chambers responded to this question and multiple answers were possible.


Twenty-five Parliaments/Chambers answered facilitated work process were benefits which had been observed from the use of AI tools, 24 Parliaments/Chambers answered time savings in drafting/research were benefits which had been observed from the use of AI tools, eight Parliaments/Chambers answered that cost efficiency was a benefit which had been observed from the use of AI tools (Danish *Folketing*, German *Bundestag*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Latvian *Saeima*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, and Spanish *Cortes Generales*), six Parliaments/Chambers answered improved access to legislative information were benefits which had been observed from the use of AI tools (Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Lithuanian

Seimas, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Slovenian *Državni zbor*, Spanish *Cortes Generales* and Swedish *Riksdag*), two Parliaments/Chambers answered that enhanced citizen engagement was a benefit which had been observed from the use of AI tools (Dutch *Eerste Kamer* and Slovenian *Državni zbor*) and four Parliaments/Chambers answered that they had no opinion.

In addition, eight Parliaments/Chambers specified what further benefits had been observed from the use of AI tools. The Finnish *Eduskunta* mentioned work process automation with the example of information search agent solutions, the German *Bundestag* specified mental load reduction, quality output improvements, quantitative output increases, complexity reduction, knowledge increase, as well as extended service offering, and the French *Assemblée nationale* specified how AI tools could reduce repetitive and time-consuming tasks. Moreover, the Spanish *Cortes Generales* elaborated how the use of AI was increasing productivity and reducing costs in multiple areas and internal processes - including advanced support for documentation work, legal assistance, information retrieval, and software development. Further to this point, the Italian *Senato della Repubblica* also indicated how AI tools have improved efficiency and accuracy across parliamentary work. In particular it was highlighted how AI tools enable automated transcription of plenary and committee sessions, support clearer analysis and organization of amendments, facilitate multilingual translation of texts and automate information monitoring for documentation and press reviews. Finally, the French *Sénat* and the Hungarian *Országgyűlés* explained that AI tools were under internal evaluation and assessment at the time of writing, and the Danish *Folketing* indicated that the benefits of the use of AI tools were not known yet, as they were still new.

17. The next question of the chapter concerned whether Parliaments/Chambers had provided training to Members of Parliament and/or staff on the use or implications of AI. Thirty-six responded to this question and a 18 Parliaments/Chambers answered that training had been provided to parliamentary staff (Austrian *Bundesrat and Nationalrat*, Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants and Senaat/Sénat*, Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Czech *Senát*, Danish *Folketing*, French *Assemblée nationale*, German *Bundesrat*, German *Bundestag*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Latvian *Saeima*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Polish *Sejm*, Portuguese *Assembleia da República*, Slovenian *Državni zbor* and the European Parliament), and seven Parliaments/Chambers answered that training had been provided to parliamentary staff and Members of Parliament (Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, French *Sénat*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati* and Spanish *Cortes Generales*). Furthermore, five Parliaments/Chambers answered that training was being planned (Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer*, Polish *Senat* and Swedish *Riksdag*); the Swedish *Riksdag* emphasised that the training being planned would be provided for both Members and staff. Finally, six Parliaments/Chambers answered that no training to Members of Parliament and/or staff on the use or implications of AI had been provided (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, Romanian *Camera Deputaților* and *Senat* and Slovak *Národná rada*).

18. The next question of the Bi-annual report concerned **if Parliaments/Chambers had a dedicated team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI** and 36 responded to the question. Fifteen Parliaments/Chambers answered that responsibilities for AI were assigned to an existing department (Czech *Senát* and *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Danish *Folketing*, Estonian *Riigikogu*, Finnish *Eduskunta*, French *Sénat*, German *Bundesrat*, Greek *Vouli ton Ellinon*, Irish *Houses of the Oireachtas*, Italian *Senato della Repubblica*, Lithuanian *Seimas*, Dutch *Tweede Kamer*, Polish *Senat*, Slovenian *Državni zbor*, and Spanish *Cortes Generales*), 10 Parliaments/Chambers answered that a dedicated AI team existed (Austrian *Bundesrat* and *Nationalrat*, Belgian *Kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers/Chambre des représentants*, Belgian *Senaat/Sénat*, Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, French *Assemblée nationale*, German *Bundestag*, Italian *Camera dei deputati*, Luxembourg *Chambre des Députés*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer* and the European Parliament) and three Parliaments/Chambers answered that a dedicated team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI was under consideration (Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Polish *Sejm* and Portuguese *Assembleia da República*). Lastly, eight Parliaments/Chambers answered that they had no dedicated team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI (Bulgarian *Narodno sabranie*, Croatian *Hrvatski sabor*, Latvian *Saeima*, Maltese *Kamra tad-Deputati*, Romanian *Camera Deputaţilor*, Romanian *Senat*, Slovak *Národná rada* and Swedish *Riksdag*).



18.1 As a follow-up Parliaments/Chambers who had answered positively were asked about **the main role of such a team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI**. Twenty-five Parliaments/Chambers responded while 11 skipped this question.

Twenty-two Parliaments/Chambers answered that the main role of the team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI was developing or coordinating the use of AI tools in parliamentary work, 20 Parliaments/Chambers additionally answered that the main role of the team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI was monitoring developments in AI and emerging technologies and similarly 20 Parliaments/Chambers answered that drafting internal guidelines or strategies on AI was the main role of the team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI. Additionally, 18 Parliaments/Chambers answered that providing training and guidance to parliamentary staff was the main role of the team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI and 12 Parliaments/Chambers answered that the main role of the team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI was advising Members of Parliament and/or committees on AI-related issues.

Further to the abovementioned, seven Parliaments/Chambers also specified the role of a team, unit or designated staff responsible for AI. Some of the recurring tasks and roles were the responsibility of keeping AI guidelines and setting the rules (Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, German *Bundestag* and Spanish *Cortes Generales*), as well as responsibility for organising and providing training on AI for members and staff to ensure and enhance understanding of AI (Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* and Spanish *Cortes Generales*). The Austrian *Bundesrat* and *Nationalrat* emphasised that a main role was supporting digital transformation and similarly the French *Assemblée nationale* emphasised a main role as assisting political and administrative authorities in identifying needs, managing projects, and implementing AI tools. A common recurrence was that the respective teams, units or staff responsible for AI consisted of or consulted with employees from various departments across the Parliaments/Chambers to contribute with experiences and expertise (Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon*, Czech *Poslanecká sněmovna*, Finnish *Eduskunta* and German *Bundestag*).

For full responses the annex to the report can be consulted.

Concluding this chapter of the Bi-Annual Report **Parliaments/Chambers were asked if they had any further information to share on the topic of the use of AI tools**. Ten Parliaments/Chambers contributed with further information, which has partly been incorporated throughout the chapter and will partly be unveiled in the following paragraphs. Additionally, additional information was provided from two Parliaments/Chambers following the closing of the questionnaire which has also been incorporated throughout the chapter.

Four out of the ten responding Parliaments/Chambers contributed with further information on the topic of guidelines and rules on the use of AI in the parliamentary work (French *Sénat*, Hungarian *Országgyűlés*, Dutch *Eerste Kamer* and Polish *Sejm*). The Dutch *Eerste Kamer* informed about the development of an AI-strategy and guidelines for using generative AI within the parliament and the French *Sénat* informed about the adoption of a charter for the use of artificial intelligence for ethical use in the service of senatorial activity and the efficiency of its administration. Similarly, the Polish *Sejm* informed that on 14 November 2025, the Chancellery of the Sejm had adopted the “Rules for the Use of Artificial Intelligence” as the

binding framework for employees' use of AI systems in activities carried out for the Chancellery, regardless of whether the tool was embedded in office software, developed internally, based on open-source solutions, or provided by an external supplier. In addition, an annex to the Rules contained a practical section ("Guidance and Examples") that clarified what was considered permissible and impermissible use of AI and identifies the risks that should be taken into account. Rounding off the additional contributions on guidelines Hungarian *Országgyűlés* elaborated how internal guidelines on the use of AI was being drafted at the time of writing.

Besides the contributions on guidelines and rules, Parliaments/Chambers also submitted a broader range of additional information, with varying levels of detail, with the following five examples.

The Cyprus *Vouli ton Antiprosopon* clarified that they considered the introduction of an AI tool to support parliamentary proceedings, e.g. focusing on automated minute-taking and speech-to-text, multilingual accessibility through simultaneous translation and real-time subtitles. It was further underlined how parliamentary staff had received training through a practical workshop on AI applications for day-to-day work and a seminar addressing critical thinking and the ethical and societal implications of AI.

The Italian *Senato della Repubblica* informed that they used AI as an institutional support rather than a decision-making authority, where AI tools help structure and manage legislative data, improve transparency, and enhance public access to parliamentary work. A distinctive feature highlighted was the *Senato della Repubblica*'s commitment to open data and open-source tools, contributing high-quality institutional data to research and European AI development. This approach positions the *Senato della Repubblica* as both a user and a contributor to AI ecosystems.

The Dutch *Eerste Kamer* among others elaborated on a conducted pilot project (partly inspired by the AI-literacy requirements as stated in the AI-Act) to test and implement several public generative AI-tools in a transparent and responsible manner, where nearly half of the employees participated in the pilot.

The Slovenian *Državni zbor* explained that they were in the early stages of introducing artificial intelligence into parliamentary work processes, and elaborated that the challenges associated with its implementation were primarily financial, staffing-related, and technical. Additionally, they were linked to ensuring compliance with the regulations governing data protection and the AI Act.

The Spanish *Cortes Generales* elaborated that several new AI-based projects were under development, including automatic indexing using the Eurovoc Thesaurus, live subtitling of parliamentary session videos, the training of a new speech-to-text transcription engine, and the evaluation of AI-assisted tools for software development. In addition the Senate plans to further integrate AI into multiple internal processes including advanced support for documentation work, legal assistance, information retrieval, and software development, potentially using tools

such as NotebookLM or similar solutions. Spanish *Cortes Generales* illustrated that one key initiative was the integration of RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) into the Senate's web search engine, allowing users to locate content using natural language and even search within video materials. Future projects also included the automatic classification and tagging of video content through face and voice recognition, as well as the acquisition of AI-based analytics and data visualization tools. Together, these initiatives would aim to improve efficiency, accessibility, transparency, and decision-making while ensuring that AI would be used in a controlled, ethical and sustainable manner.

For the full set of responses the annex to the report can be consulted.